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Blockchain, one of the most disruptive technologies in this century, has gained exten-
sive attention in both academia and industry. Blockchain is a technological innovation
and global platform that brings a new paradigm for business. Blockchain has a number
of features that previous systems do not have, such as it is decentralised, distributed, im-
mutable and publicly accessible. As a result, blockchain has many potentials to address
some stumbling block security weaknesses in concrete applications, such as manufactur-
ing, finance and the government sector. However, by merely replacing the databases or
public ledgers of existing systems with the blockchain will not solve the problem since
this approach may reduce the efficiency dramatically and brings new security issues in
the systems. Thus, to find more “killer” applications of blockchain besides cryptocurren-
cies and build practical security protocols atop blockchain remains a challenging research
topic.
In this thesis, we aim to find applications of blockchain by carrying out the study
on blockchain-based security protocols. That is, we focus on the issues of the surveil-
lance of cryptocurrencies, decentralised e-voting, contractual equivocation and stateless
blockchain. To be more specific, we make the following contributions in this thesis.
First, we introduce a new cryptocurrency named Traceable Monero to balance user
anonymity and accountability. In Traceable Monero, normal transactions can still be con-
ducted anonymously as in the Monero system except that there exists a tracing authority
who is able to revoke a payer’s anonymity due to his/her misbehaviour. Our proposed
framework is optimistic, in that the tracing authority is only involved when investigations
in certain transactions are required. We formalise the system model and security model of
Traceable Monero and present a detailed construction of Traceable Monero by overlaying
Monero with two types of tracing mechanisms, tracing the one-time addresses with money
flows and tracing the long-term addresses. We prove the security of Traceable Monero
and implement a prototype of the system, which demonstrates that Traceable Monero in-




Second, we introduce a framework of the self-tallying voting system, which is suit-
able in decentralised IoT based on blockchain. We propose a concrete construction and
prove that the proposed system satisfies all the security requirements, including fairness,
dispute-freeness and maximal ballot secrecy. We implement the algorithms on a laptop,
an Android phone and a Raspberry Pi to simulate the voting devices in order to test the
time consumption and evaluate the gas cost of each algorithm in a private blockchain. The
implementation results demonstrate the practicability of our system.
Third, we propose a blockchain-based solution to address contractual equivocation,
which supports user-defined fine-grained policy-based equivocation. In our system, users
will be de-incentive if the statements they made breach the predefined access rules. The
core of our solution is a newly introduced primitive named policy-authentication-prevent-
ing signature (PoAPS), which combined with a deposit mechanism enables a signer to
make conflict statements corresponding to a policy to be penalised. We present a generic
construction of PoAPS based on policy-based verifiable secret sharing and demonstrate its
practicality via a concrete implementation in the blockchain. Compared with the existing
solutions that only handle specific types of equivocation, our proposed approach is more
generic and can be instantiated to deal with various kinds of equivocation.
Finally, we study effective tools in the stateless blockchain, namely subvector commit-
ments. We analyse important properties of subvector commitments and propose a new
primitive called mercurial subvector commitments, which are efficiently updatable, mer-
curial hiding, position binding, and aggregatable. We formalise the system model and se-
curity model for such a primitive and present a concrete construction with security proofs
to show that it satisfies all of the properties. Moreover, we illustrate how the proposed
mercurial subvector commitments benefit in zero-knowledge sets and the applications in
stateless blockchain with mercurial subvector commitments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“In Blockchain We Trust”
– M. J. Casey and P. Vigna
MIT Technology Review, 2018
Blockchain has emerged as a novel decentralised mechanism that allows data to be
securely stored and verified without relying on centralised authority. It was proposed in
2008 as the underlying technology of cryptocurrencies. Technically speaking, blockchain
is a distributed append-only database that can be publicly accessed and maintained by all
users in the system. The evolving transactional data in the system are organised into a
hierarchical chain of blockchain without being tampered with or removed. Blockchain is
a profound technique that changes the way to do business in the world and is regarded as
the most significant revolution after the Internet appearsa. Blockchain has many potential
merits. For example, (1) Blockchain is distributed: It allows a variety of peers to take part
in the network without registration, making it much easier than traditional centralised
systems [83, 126]. (2) Blockchain is decentralised: Instead of relying on a third party
to build trust, blockchain transplants trust into the system via consensus mechanism. (3)
Blockchain is immutable: Information on blockchain exists as a shared and intact copy.
Once it is linked to the chain, it cannot tamper. Due to the aforementioned attracting
features of blockchain, it serves as the backbone technique in various applications as
depicted in Figure 1.1, such as industry, medicare, insurance and economics.
ahttps://www.entrepreneur.com/article/288964.
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Figure 1.1: Blockchain applications
1.1 Blockchain revisited
In this section, we illustrate how blockchain achieves decentralised systems, and in-
troduce several typical blockchain systems, including bitcoin and ethereum with smart
contracts.
1.1.1 Blockchain
Blockchain is an append-only decentralised digital ledger based on public-key cryptog-
raphy. Blockchain provides a platform to conduct peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions without
any third party. Any modification to the system has a record on the chain with a digital
signature for public verification. The ledger is generated and maintained by all partici-
pates in the system. Thus if any single entity or organisation that would like to disrupt
the public blockchain system should control the majority of the hash rate in the system,
say 51%. Blockchains can be classified into three categories, namely public blockchains,
consortium blockchains and private blockchains. In public blockchains, users can freely
join or leave the system, such as the bitcoin blockchain [97] and Ethereum [124]. In con-
sortium blockchains and private blockchains, users need to get approval to enrol in the
system. We take the public blockchain as an example to show how blockchain system
works. Peers join the system with unique private-public key pairs, in which the public
keys are the users’ identities. Users in blockchain system can conduct transactions, which
include the details of the changes to the system, say some necessary information and a
signature. Miners choose some transactions from the mining pool and generate a block.
Figure 1.2 shows typical block structures in the blockchain. A block is composed of a
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Figure 1.2: Blockchain Architectures
block header and block body. A block header usually includes some basic information of
this block, such as version number, timestamp, block size and transaction numbers etc. A
block body is composed of some transactions signed by a user with his unique private key.
The transactions are validated with the corresponding public key and can be batched into
blocks by the miners. A Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) is usually employed to generate a hash
value of all the transactions in this block to reduce the stora e overhead of the chain. A
block also contains the hash value of the previous block to link these two blocks together.
Each block links to the previous block, thus form a chain. The block can be logged into
the blockchain when the miners solve some pre-defined hard problems to achieve consen-
sus, such as proof of work (PoW) and proof of stake (PoS). The block is then appended to
the chain and broadcast to all the nodes in the system. The other nodes accept this block
by using its hash as part of the newly generated block.
1.1.2 Bitcoin
Bitcoin [97], the first decentralised cryptocurrency, was proposed by Nakamoto et al.
in 2008 and has gained great prosperity since its inception. In 2021, the price of bitcoin
smashed through forty thousand dollars and hit a new record to $ 40,430, and the market
capitalisation is 729 billion dollarsb. Bitcoin now serves as the underlying platform of a
number of other cryptocurrency systems, e.g., Zerocoin and Monero [94, 116]. In recent
years, cryptocurrencies have garnered extensive attention from academia as well as in-
dustry and even governments. Until 2021, more than 2000 types of cryptocurrencies have
bhttps://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/
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been proposed with various features to cater to distinct demands.
We take the bitcoin system as an example to show how to trade digital asset via blockchain.
Bitcoin system employs UTXO (Unspent transaction output) model to conduct transac-
tions and resist double-spending attack. The UTXOs are maintained in a list, in which
each record in the list is generated by early transactions. The input accounts in a trans-
action should be the records from UTXO list and the output accounts in the transaction
are the new records to the list. A valid transaction will enable the input UTXOs removed
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Figure 1.3: Bitcoin Transactions
As shown in Figure 1.3, transaction TX1001 is the coinbase transactionc, which has
no input account and the output is the rewarded 12.5B from mining. The user with pk1
contains 12.5B in his account after TX1001. In transaction TX2001, it takes as input pk1
and generates two UTXOs pk2 and pk3 with 10B and 2.5B, respectively. The miners
check whether there are enough bitcoins in the output UTXO in TX1001#1 to validate
this transaction. Once the transaction is approved, pk1 is discarded in UTXO lists and
two new records pk2 and pk3 are generated with a specific number of bitcoins, which
serves as input accounts in new transactions. Bitcoin supports multiple UTXOs as inputs,
as shown in transaction TX8001. TX5001 has a UTXO 3001#3 with 3B in the account
generated by previous transactions and now is part of the inputs of transaction TX3001.
cA coinbase transaction is created by a miner to reward the mining work, which is paid from the system
by design and thus no input account in such transactions
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Digital assets are transferred via transactions and each transaction in the system leads to
the generation of new UTXOs and revocation of used UTXOs.
1.1.3 Smart contracts
The concept of smart contracts [119] was proposed by Nick Szabo when he realised
that the decentralised ledger could achieve automatic contractual practice. Smart contracts
are digital equivalent to contracts in real life. Compared to traditional trusted lawyer or
notary, smart contracts can act as trusted third parties without any assumption, in order to
help two parties exchange assets, property, shares etc. Specifically, smart contracts are ac-
tually a tiny computer program stored on blockchain that runs automatically when some
specific conditions are met. Each party can eventually get the results as defined in the
rules as well as the penalties in the agreement. Smart contracts have the following prop-
erties. (1) Autonomy. Smart contracts can be executed independently and automatically
in a prescribed manner following the built-in codes. It is impossible for any single user
to force a smart contract on-chain to release funds at their will before the requirements of
this smart contract are met. (2) Trust. It is hard for a hacker to crack the codes and infil-
trate. (3) Accuracy. Smart contracts are faster, cheaper and more accurate than traditional
contracts. It can avoid the human errors caused by filling in the forms. (4) Distribution.
The output of a smart contract can be verified publicly in the system and achieve consen-
sus. Smart contracts have wide applications, such as crowdfunding, processing claim in
insurance, automatic payment for banks etc. Smart contracts can be programmed through
specific languages. The most applied is Solidity, which has a similar syntax to JavaScript.
Ethereum is the biggest platform designed to support smart contracts so far, which will
be introduced in subsection 1.1.4.
1.1.4 Ethereum
Ethereumd, proposed by Vitalik Buterin in 2013, is an open-sourced public blockchain
platform with built-in Turing-complete stack-based programming language to support de-
centralised applications and smart contracts. It provides decentralised virtual machines
Ethereum Virtual Machines (EVM) to handle point-to-point smart contracts. EVM is a
powerful virtual stack for executing contract bytecode, which is completely isolated from
the network, filesystem and processes on the host computer, in order to ensure the in-
tegrity and security of the codes. The Ethereum platform is commonly regarded as “the
dhttps://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper
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next generation of cryptocurrencies and decentralised application platforms”. Ethereum
system is under account-based model with state transitions. Compared to UTXO model,
the account-based model is much more similar to the financial system in the real world.
When a user spends some money in the system, the corresponding amount of coins is
deducted from the balance and when receiving money, the amount is added to the balance
of the account. Ethereum contains two types of accounts, which are externally owned
accounts and contract accounts. Externally owned accounts are like normal personal
accounts controlled by users’ private keys and contract accounts load some programs
controlled by contract codes. Contracts are created by transactions with a special “to” ad-
dress. Specifically, to generate a smart contract, a peer can generate a transaction and pay
to a special zero account, then a contract account will be generated with a new account
address using the creator’s address together with some nonce. To launch a smart contract,
a user needs to conduct a transaction with his controlled account as input and the spe-
cific contract account as the output, plus some transaction amount as the fees to execute
the codes (gas costs) in the transaction. The mechanism to log a valid transaction to the
blockchain is similar to that in bitcoin system. While Ethereum has a smaller block size
compared to the bitcoin, and the time for generating a block is much shorter (about 14 sec-
onds) than the bitcoin block (about 10 minutes). Ether is the digital currency in Ethereum
to pay for the transaction fee and code running fee, which can exchange gas used for
code execution to resist an infinite loop. Ethereum currency has been the second-largest
cryptocurrency with a market capitalisation of 191 billion dollars in February 2021e.
Ethereum blockchain and bitcoin blockchain are two main applications of blockchain.
The dominate difference is that bitcoin blockchain is for tracking the transfer of ownership
of cryptocurrencies while Ethereum blockchain focuses more on running programming
codes on the platform, which achieves more powerful functionality such as voting and
fair exchange.
1.2 Research background
In this section, we introduce the research background of each subtopic of the thesis,
and then figure out the research problem.
ehttps://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/
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1.2.1 Cryptocurrencies in blockchain
A cryptocurrency is a kind of digital currency that relies on powerful cryptographic
tools, such as digital signatures and hash functions, to secure the transactions. Rather
than depending on some central parties to conduct transactions in traditional e-cash sys-
tems, the feature of cryptocurrency is to remove the central parties by building a pure
peer-to-peer (P2P) system where all the participants make decisions collectively. A de-
centralised system reduces the possibility of single-point-of-failure. Moreover, such a
P2P system makes it easier for the users to join or leave. Due to the decentralised nature,
cryptocurrency systems usually need to maintain a public ledger to achieve consensus,
which can be realised by the blockchain. Besides decentralisation, anonymity is another
main feature of cryptocurrencies. It seems easy to achieve anonymity due to the removal
of central parties, because transactions can be conducted directly between a payer and a
payee in the P2P system and no other parties are necessary to be involved in a transac-
tion. However, the record of this transaction has to be linked on the public ledger for the
whole lifetime once it is confirmed, otherwise, it is hard to deal with the issue of double-
spending. To protect users’ privacy in the bitcoin system, users are identified by their
public keys, instead of their real-world identities, which is known as pseudonyms. A user
can generate as many public keys as they want in the system. However, such a pseudonym
mechanism still exposes users’ privacy in some way.
In cryptocurrencies, an important aspect of user privacy is the unlinkability of the ad-
dresses in transactions. Unfortunately, linkability is possible in bitcoin transactions due
to the multi-input transactions. Moreover, transaction analysis, such as “taint” analysis,
tracking payments and IP address monitoring nodes, would also expose users’ privacy
based on statistical methods. If a payer conducts some payment with his multiple ac-
counts jointly, then it is certain to infer that these accounts are controlled by the same
payer. Worse still, if there is some change in a transaction, which is common in trans-
actions, a newly-generated UTXO will appear in the output accounts of the transaction.
Thus, it can be assumed that the UTXO account for the change belongs to the payer. As
previously mentioned, blockchain contains all the confirmed transactions which are pub-
licly accessible by everyone in the system. Once an attacker gets through all the transac-
tions in the ledger, it is easy to obtain money flow diagrams as a transaction network, and
user account graphs as a user network to show the relationships among the transactions,
in which a large amount of implied information can be revealed [73]. Thus we need to
enhance the privacy of bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies.
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However, in some applications, full anonymity is undesirable and may hinder the devel-
opment of cryptocurrencies due to the violation of government regulations. Anonymity
provides a cover to perform stealth transactions for many illegal adoptions, such as money
laundering, drug trading and tax evasion, etc. Many hackers take the wheel of anonymous
cryptocurrencies to collect illegal funds. The infamous black market Silk Road is a typ-
ical underground black market that sells drugs, weapons and other illegal products. The
payments in Silk Road are conducted by bitcoin and communicated with TOR service,
which leaves the Silk Road in a grey area of government and law enforcement control on
the transactions. Due to lacking proper regulations and controls, anonymous cryptocur-
rencies suffer criticism from governments as well f. Many countries are seeking solutions
to put cryptocurrencies under surveillance g. For example, the South Korean government
plans to increase its supervision of cryptocurrency transactionsh. On July 21, 2014, the
New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) released a comprehensive vir-
tual currency regulatory framework Bitlicensei, which covers consumer protection, anti-
money laundering compliance and cyber security rules. Thus traceability is also important
in cryptocurrencies as well.
Research problem. Anonymity and traceability are two critical properties for cryp-
tocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies use various techniques to protect user privacy, such as
zero-knowledge proof and commitment, which provides zero knowledge and hiding prop-
erty, respectively, and is computationally infeasible to reveal the identity from an outside
observer. Therefore, to trace the transactions is a technically intractable problem and
more techniques are needed to achieve traceability. Thus in this thesis, we aim to balance
the anonymity and traceability in cryptocurrencies.
1.2.2 Voting in blockchain
Paper-based voting is the approach in early stages to achieve democracy, which is time-
wasting and resource costing. E-voting is the electronic version of paper-based voting
systems, in which the voters cast their ballots via the internet using a personal computer
or mobile phone. E-voting can be classified into three categories. (1) Supervised voting,






ihttps://www.davispolk.com/files/2015-06-05 New Yorks Final BitLicense Rule.pdf
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stations but not connected, and voters are supervised physically by independent electoral
authorities. (2) Hybrid voting where voters are supervised physically by election officials
but the voting machines are internet-connected. (3) Remote online voting, where the
voters are unsupervised by election officials.
We review a well-know e-voting protocol by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta with an ab-
breviation FOO protocol [55]. The protocol was designed based on blind signature [33]
and there were no formal security models when this protocol was invented in 1992. How-
ever, it is widely believed that the FOO protocol achieves the privacy property in spite of
no security proofs for it. In the FOO voting system, three entities are involved, including
an administrator, a counter and voters, as shown in Figure 1.4. In some applications, the
counter can be replaced by a public board, since the counter is to create a list of ballots
and publish the list. The administrator is responsible for checking if a voter is illegible
to vote and generates a valid ticket for a legal voter, which is a blind signature of a vote.
Briefly, the FOO protocol consists of the following steps.
Admin Counter
Voters
Figure 1.4: FOO protocol
(1) A voter prepares his/her ballot, signs it and keeps a random value private.
(2) A voter gets a certificate by authenticating herself to the administrator and obtains
a blind signature on her ballot.
(3) A voter submits her ballot along with the administrator’s signature to the counter
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anonymously.
(4) The counter returns a voting number to the voter.
(5) Upon closing the election, the voter sends his/her private random value to the
counter in an anonymous way.
Research problem. Most of the traditional e-voting systems are centralised, in which
a central party is inevitable to collect and cast the ballot as well as to reveal the results.
The central party should be fully trusted, or else the results are not reliable. Blockchain is
an effective tool to achieve decentralised systems. Thus blockchain-based voting systems
are alternatives to resist the drawbacks in centralised voting systems. However, this still
raises fairness issues. In this thesis, we are investigating blockchain-based fair voting
systems.
1.2.3 Non-equivocation in blockchain
Equivocation, which refers to dishonest parties conveying conflicting statements in a
protocol, could cause various disasters, such as errors and attacks, to occur in a system.
Equivocation is known as uniquely attributable faultj, in which a clear evidence always
applies for an entity to commit to the fault. Typical examples of equivocation include
double-spending in cryptocurrencies, issuing multiple certificates for an identity in public-
key infrastructure, etc. Equivocation is one of the essential issues in designing protocols
for distributed systems since it could cause Byzantine faults [27]. Traditional solutions,
involving a trusted party (or trusted hardware) [7] to identify equivocation, can be effec-
tively designed and implemented, but unfortunately, is impractical. Other solutions rely
on the assumptions of an honest majority or the synchrony of the system. Equivocation
is also the main reason Byzantine agreement in general requires N = 3 f +1 nodes for at
most f nodes failure [118].
Publicly verifiable append-only logs, together with consensus protocols, can adequately
detect equivocation in a system. As a revolutionary technology, blockchain [21, 82, 97]
provides a remedy to realise an immutable and decentralised public ledger that securely
records all the transactions in the system, and hence paves a revolutionary mechanism for
detecting and handling equivocation without relying on any trusted party. For example,
to prevent the typical multi-spending equivocation in a payment system, bitcoin allows
users to sign multiple transactions, but only one of these transactions will be appended
into the blockchain under UTXO mechanism. There exist some other ways to efficiently
jhttps://docs.alchemyapi.io/alchemy/resources/blockchain-glossary
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prevent equivocation [122]. Nevertheless, bitcoin does not offer any solution to penalise
or terminate equivocation, and the panacea is not generally applicable in other application
domains.
Research problem. As we discussed above, to achieve non-equivocation in a dis-
tributed protocol is not straightforward. There are few solutions achieving non-equivocation.
However, the solutions are to passively detect rather than actively penalise to prevent.
Moreover, the existing solutions only deal with specific types of equivocation, say double-
spending, rather than the general cases. In this thesis, we aim to achieve non-equivocation
in blockchain for more general conditions integrating the deposit techniques provided by
cryptocurrencies to de-incentive the users.
1.2.4 Subvector commitments and stateless blockchain
Blockchain is a database to store digital assets. Transaction validation is mainly to
check whether there is enough balance of the digital assets in the account when a user
conducts a transaction. Naively searching the whole blockchain to find out the balance
in a specific account is a challenge since the size of blockchain is enormous. Blockchain
is an ever-growing ledger that records all the historical transactions in the system. Till
Feb 2021, the size of bitcoin blockchain and ethereum blockchain is over 300 GB and
200 GB, respectively, according to a report by Blockchairk. In this case, stateful verifica-
tion is helpful. Instead of querying the whole blockchain, the solution to check a small
amount of data is proposed, namely stateful verification. In stateful verification, a smaller
state is maintained for miners to validate the transactions. Recall that, in blockchain-
based cryptocurrencies, there are two models in general, namely UTXO model by bitcoin
[97] and account-based model by ethereum [41, 124]. In bitcoin-like system, the state is
UTXO. To validate a transaction is to check whether the input account is in UTXO list.
In account-based model, the state is maintained in a Patricia trie, holding the balance of
all the accounts in the system. With stateful verification, only the state, rather than all
the blocks, are needed to validate a transaction. However, the size of the state is still not
succinct, to be the magnitude of GB. Moreover, if the stateful verification is executed in
parallel, this may cause errorsl. Thus the concept of stateless blockchain is proposed in
2018m.
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ness is generated by the user when conducting a transaction. Thus, the miner validates a
transaction with the witness and the commitment by only accessing to the latest block. To
generate the constant-sized commitment, subvector commitments are always leveraged.
However, the current subvector commitments care less about the privacy of the accounts.
Regarding privacy, e.g. hiding the amount in the account, solutions to well-address the is-
sue in UTXO model have been proposed, which are shown in section 3.2. However, in the
account-based model, it remains an open problem to build stateless verification [35] with
privacy. Few existing works considered this problem and the results are barely satisfac-
tory. Guan et al. [63] proposed a privacy-preserving account-based blockchain based on
heavy zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (ZK-SNARKs)
[18]. Ma et al. [88] enhanced the privacy of the transactions in account-based model
based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof and homomorphic encryption. Gorbunov
et al. [60] briefly mentioned their construction is promising to be extended to enjoy hiding
property, but there is no formal construction or security proofs.
Research problem. Stateless verification can dramatically reduce the overhead of
transaction validation in blockchain. Subvector commitments are essential tools in state-
less verification. However, the existing works care less about privacy. In this thesis, we
investigate a model to balance the efficiency and privacy of account-based cryptocurren-
cies in blockchain.
1.3 Contributions and organisation of this thesis
In this thesis, we consider blockchain and its secure applications, including blockchain-
based cryptocurrencies, blockchain-based decentralised voting, non-equivocation in block-
chain and stateless blockchain. We presented the background and introduction of block-
chain and the research background of each topic in this chapter.
In Chapter 2, we introduce some foundations and preliminaries used in this thesis. We
first recall the knowledge of algebra number theory and then give description of intractable
assumptions. Finally, we show some cryptographic primitives, including public-key en-
cryption, digital signatures, hash functions, commitments and zero-knowledge proofs.
In Chapter 3, we introduce Traceable Monero, a new cryptocurrency system that can
simultaneously achieve conditional anonymity and traceability in Monero . We formal-
ize the system model and the security model of Traceable Monero, including balance,
anonymity and traceability. We instantiate Traceable Monero. We propose two trac-
ing mechanisms atop an improved Monero, and prove that the proposed system achieves
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all the security requirements in the formalised security model. We implement the pro-
posed scheme. The performance analysis and experimental results demonstrate that the
proposed system incurs only a small overhead compared with the underlying Monero
system.
In Chapter 4, we aim to improve the fairness of blockchain-based self-tallying systems
for decentralised IoT. We propose a concrete construction of a blockchain-based self-
tallying voting protocol in decentralised IoT, and prove that it satisfies fairness, dispute-
freeness, and maximal ballot secrecy. Specifically, in our construction, we modify the
commitment in [90] and the recovery phase in [69] to handle abortive issues, and sug-
gest that using timed commitment to deal with adaptive issues in self-tallying voting
schemes. We implement the proposed protocol on a laptop, a mobile phone and Rasp-
berry Pi, respectively, to test the time consumption. The gas cost is also evaluated on a
private blockchain. The implementation results demonstrate its practicality in real-world
applications.
In Chapter 5, we propose a policy-authentication-preventing signature (PoAPS) which
allows the extraction of a signer’s secret key when he/she signs messages violating a
pre-defined policy. We formalise the definition and the security model of PoAPS and
present a generic construction. The design is with the help of a new primitive named
policy-based verifiable secret sharing (PBVSS), in which a secret can be shared based
on general policies and each share supports public verifiability. We achieve policy-based
non-equivocation in blockchain by integrating PoAPS with a blockchain-based deposit
mechanism. Users who produce signatures for conflicting messages that violate a pre-
defined policy will be penalised by the loss of the deposit. We evaluate the proposed
algorithms to test the time consumption off-chain. We also implement the system in a test
net of blockchain to check the gas cost on-chain. Both implementation results demonstrate
high efficiency and practicality.
In Chapter 6, we focus on the important tools in stateless blockchain and analyse im-
portant properties of vector commitments. We propose a new primitive called mercurial
subvector commitments, which are efficiently updatable, mercurial hiding, position bind-
ing, and aggregatable. We formalise the system model and security model for such a
primitive and present a concrete construction with security proofs to show that it satisfies
all of the properties. Moreover, we also illustrate some applications of mercurial sub-
vector commitments, including zero-knowledge sets and blockchain with account-based
models.
We conclude the thesis in Chapter 7 with some open problems and several potential




“The uniform character of mathematics is the essence of science,
for mathematics is the foundation of all exact scientific knowledge.”
– David Hilbert, 1862 – 1943
In this section, we present necessary foundations and preliminaries used throughout
this thesis.
2.1 Algebra and number theory
Algebra and number theory are the foundation of public-key cryptography. The se-
curity of the constructions in this thesis mainly relies on algebra and number theory. In
this section, we recall several preliminaries, including group theory, bilinear maps and
algebraic group model. We refer the readers to [68] for a more complex account.
2.1.1 Group theory
Definition 2.1. A group is a set G with a binary operation ◦ on G satisfying the following
properties.
• Closure: ∀a,b ∈ G, a◦b ∈ G.
• Associativity: ∀a,b,c ∈ G, (a◦b)◦ c = a◦ (b◦ c).
• Identity: ∃1G ∈ G, ∀a ∈ G, we have a◦1G = 1G ◦a = a.
15
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• Reverse: ∀a ∈ G, ∃a−1 ∈ G, such that a◦a−1 = a−1 ◦a = 1G.
Definition 2.2. A group is Abelian if for all a,b ∈ G, we have a◦b = b◦a.
Definition 2.3. A group is cyclic if there exists an element g ∈ G, such that for all the
elements a ∈G, there is a positive integer i > 0, satisfying a = gi. The element g is called
the generator of group G and i is the order of the element a. The order of the generator g
is the order of the group G.
Definition 2.4. Let G be a group with ◦ and G′ be a non-empty set. G′ is a subgroup of G
if G′ is the subset of G and G′ is a group on ◦.
2.1.2 Bilinear maps
Let G1, G2 and GT denote cyclic groups of the same prime order p. A bilinear pairing
e : G1×G2→ GT is a map satisfying the following properties [68]:
• Bilinear: e(ua,vb) = e(u,v)ab, for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a,b ∈ Zp.
• Non-degenerate: e(g1,g2) 6= 1, where g1 and g2 are generators of group G1 and G2,
respectively.
• Computational: e(u,v) can be computed efficiently for all u ∈ G1 and v ∈ G2.
Based on Galbraith et al. [56], pairings can be classified into three types, shown as fol-
lows.
• Type I: G1 = G2 or there is an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ and ψ−1
between G1 and G2.
• Type II: G1 6= G2 but there is an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ from G2
and G1 (but not the inverse), e.g., ψ(g2) = g1.
• Type II: G1 6= G2 and there is no efficiently computable isomorphism between G1
and G2.
Type I pairing is known as symmetric pairing and Type II and III are asymmetric pair-
ings. Type I pairing is widely used in cryptographic schemes due to the concise form of
notation. However, it is less efficient than the asymmetric pairings in real-world imple-
mentation.
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2.1.3 Algebraic group model
The algebraic group model (AGM) [54] is a model lying in between the standard model
and generic group model (GGM). It was proposed to overcome the limitation of GGM that
GGM does not cover group-specific algorithms to use the representation of a group. GGM
model proves security in reduction, which is the same as the standard model. In the AGM
model, algebraic adversaries are considered, which is allowed to compute the elements in
the target group and can use the representation in binary. To be more specific, suppose
L = (L0, · · · ,Lm) ∈ G be a list of group elements in group G. An algebraic adversary can




Let λ be a security parameter and G denotes a cyclic group of prime order p. g is the
generator of G. Then we define the following assumptions in such group.
2.2.1 Discrete Logarithm assumption.
Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem is that, given a tuple (g,ga) ∈ G and output a ∈ Zp.
DL assumption holds in G if for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A ,
the following advantage AdvDLA is negligible in λ .
AdvDLA (λ ) = Pr [A (g,g
a)→ a]
2.2.2 Decisional Diffie-Hellmam assumption
Decisional Diffie-Hellmam (DDH) problem [68] states that given a tuple (g,ga,gb,
g(1−x)ab+xc)∈G and output x∈{0,1}. DDH assumption holds in G if for any polynomial-
time algorithm C , the following advantage AdvDDHC (λ ) is negligible in λ .
AdvDDHC (λ ) =
∣∣∣Pr[C (g,ga,gb,gab) = 1]−Pr[C (g,ga,gb,gc) = 1]∣∣∣
2.2.3 Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption




, · · · ,gα l ,gα l+2,
· · · ,gα2l
)
for a random α ∈ Zp, and output gα
l+1
. The l-DHE problem defined in an asym-
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for a random α ∈ Zp, output gα
l+1
1 . l-DHE as-
sumption holds in (G1,G2) if for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A ,
the following advantage AdvDHEA is negligible in λ .



























In this section, we review several typical cryptographic tools required in the following
chapters.
2.3.1 Public-key encryption
Public-key encryption was proposed in [46] as the new direction of cryptography in
terms of symmetric-key cryptography. It is a fundamental tool to protect the privacy of
a message. In public-key cryptography, a pair of keys are involved, say public key and
secret key. Public-key encryption allows a user to encrypt a message under the public key
and decrypt the message with the corresponding secret key. Encryption is widely used to
keep the confidentiality of messages when transfer or exchange messages. We introduce
a typical ElGamal encryption [49], which was proposed based on Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol.
Setup. Let G be a cyclic group with prime order q and generator g ∈ G. Choose a
random x ∈ Z∗q as a secret key, and the public key is y = gx.
Enc. On input the recipient’s public key y, to encrypt a message m, choose a random r
and compute c1 = gr and c2 = myr. The ciphertext is (c1,c2).
Dec. The entity who has the knowledge of the secret key x can decrypt the ciphertext
and recover the message m as m = c2/c1x.
ElGamal encryption is semantically secure under the DDH assumption. Another merit
of ElGamal encryption is the inherent homomorphism by design. Specifically, the cipher-
texts of m0,m1 can be easily aggregated to obtain the ciphertext of m0m1.
A distributed ElGamal cryptosystem [19] is a generalisation of original ElGamal en-
cryption, which supports to encrypt a message under the public key of a group of users
and decrypt the message in a distributed way. A distributed ElGamal scheme contains the
following algorithms.
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Setup. Suppose there are n users in the system, and the key pairs of the i-th user are
(xi,yi = gxi). Each user publishes his public key, and the common public key can be





Enc. To encrypt a message m, randomly choose r and compute a ciphertext (c1,c2) of
m as (gr,yr ·gm).
Dec. Each user computes and broadcasts the partial decryption key cxi1 . Then the de-







Digital signatures, proposed in [46], are cryptographic tools to authenticate an entity or
check the integrity of a signed message. Digital signatures are widely used in authentica-
tion and integrity checking. Digital signatures are also a key exponent in blockchain to
ensure security. A digital signature Σ consists of the following three algorithms [68].
• DKeyGen(1λ ). On input a security parameter λ , this algorithm setups the system
and returns a key pair (sk, pk).
• DSign(sk,m). This algorithm takes a message m and the secret key sk as input, it
outputs a digital signature σ .
• DVerify(pk,m,σ). On input the message signature pair (m,σ), this algorithm out-
puts 0/1 to indicate the validity.
A digital signature cannot be forgeable under chosen message attack, in which an at-
tacker can learn the signatures on arbitrary messages of its choice. A formal definition is
shown as follows.
Definition 2.5. A digital signature Σ is existentially unforgeable under chosen message
attack (EUF-CMA), if for all PPT adversaries A , we have,
AdvEUF-CMAΣ,A = Pr[Exp
EUF-CMA
Σ,A (λ ) = 1]≤ negl(λ ),
where the experiment ExpEUF-CMA
Σ,A (λ ) is shown in Figure 2.1.
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ExpEUF-CMA
Σ,A (λ ):
(skσ , pkσ )← DKeyGen(1λ ).
Q← /0
(m∗,σ∗)←A DSign’(sk,·)(pk)
where DSign’ on input m:
σ ← DSign(sk,m), Q←Q∪m
return σ
return 1, if DVerify(pk,m∗,σ∗) = 1∧m∗ /∈Q
return 0
Figure 2.1: EUF-CMA security
2.3.3 Hash function and Random Oracle Model
A Hash function [91] H : {0,1}∗→ {0,1}λ is an algorithm that maps an input of any
length into an output with fixed-length λ , in which λ is determined by different algo-
rithms. Normally, a hash function has the following properties.
• Computability: Given an input x ∈ {0,1}∗, it is easy to verify h = H(x).
• One-wayness: Given an output h, it is computationally infeasible to find the pre-
image x, such that h = H(x).
• Weak collision resistance: For any given input x ∈ {0,1}∗, it is computationally
infeasible to find another string y 6= x for some y ∈ {0,1}∗, such that H(x) = H(y);
• Strong collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find two inputs x 6= y
for some x,y ∈ {0,1}∗, such that H(x) = H(y);
Hash function also plays an essential role in cryptography. It is usually used to generate
a short index of long messages to reduce the storage overhead and check the integrity of
the messages. Hash functions are commonly leveraged in practical applications, such as
MSH in blockchain and hash tables in bloom filters.
In cryptography, random oracle models [10, 26] are usually viewed as an ideal sub-
stitute for hash functions, which are used in the schemes that require strong random as-
sumptions on the output of hash function. In random oracle models, hash functions are
treated as oracles to answer the queries. For queries to any input, random oracles will
return a uniformly random output, which has consistent distribution with the real output.
Same queries should share the same response from the oracle. It is widely accepted in
cryptography that the security of a scheme under the random oracle model is strong evi-
dence to show the scheme is practical and reliable. However, some believe that random
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oracle model is a heuristic assumption. It should be pointed out that not all cryptographic
schemes that use hash functions require random oracles. If the scheme only needs to sat-
isfy partial properties of the hash function, random oracle models may not be necessary.
2.3.4 Commitments
A commitment scheme allows a committer to commit to a selected message, which is
hidden to others but can be revealed by the sender. Specifically, a commitment scheme
consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms (CGen,Com,Open).
• CGen(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ , this algorithm outputs a public com-
mitment key ctk.
• Com(ctk,m,r): On input a commitment key ctk, a message m ∈ {0,1}∗ and some
randomness r, this algorithm outputs a commitment c.
• Open(c,m,r): On input a commitment c, the message m and the randomness r, it
checks c ?= Com(ctk,m;r)
A commitment scheme is secure if it satisfies the properties of binding and hiding defined
as follows.
Hiding. Hiding requires that the commitment c reveals nothing about m. Specifically,
a commitment is hiding if for any PPT adversary A , we have∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr








Binding. It is infeasible for a committer to generate a commitment c that can be opened
as two different messages m0,m1. Specifically, for any polynomial-time adversary A ,
Pr
 Com(m0,r0) =Com(m1,r1)





We now introduce the classic Pedersen commitment [101]. On input a parameter λ ,
CGen generates a cyclic group G with prime order q, two generators g,h ∈ Zq and outputs
ctk = (G,g,h). To commit to a message m ∈ Zq, the committer generates a random r ∈ Zp
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and computes c = Com(ctk,m;r) = gmhr. To open a commitment c, the committer reveals
m,r and everyone can check if c = Com(ctk,m;r). Pedersen commitment also satisfies
the homomorphic property.
Homomorphic. For λ ∈ N, m0,m1,r0,r1 ∈ Zq, it holds that,
Com(m0,r0) ·Com(m1,r1) =Com(m0 +m1,r0 + r1).
where + is the operation in Zq and · is the operation in group G.
2.3.5 Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge and Σ-protocol
Let R = (x,w) be a binary relation, where x is the common input and w is a witness. A
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge is a protocol in which a prover P proves to a verifier
V that it knows a witness w for which (x,w) ∈ R without revealing anything.
A Σ-Protocol is a way to design efficient zero-knowledge proofs. A protocol is a Σ-
Protocol for relation R if it has 3-move as shown in Fig 2.2. 1) P sends a commitment
a to V . 2) V sends a random t-bit challenge e to P . 3) P sends a response r, and
V decides to accept or reject based on the verification algorithm. A Σ-protocol has the
following properties.
Prover Verifier
(random SP) (random SV )
((v,w) ∈ R) (v ∈ LR )
a = α(v,w,SP)
a−−−−−−−→





• Completeness. If P and V follow the protocol on input x and w, where (x,w) ∈ R,
the verifier always accepts the prover’s proof.
2.4. SUMMARY 23
• Special soundness. For any x and any accepting conversations on x with the same
commitment a and different challenges (a,e,r) and (a,e′,r′), where e 6= e′, one can
efficiently extract w such that (x,w) ∈ R.
• Honest verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK). There is a polynomial-time simulator,
which on input x and a challenge e outputs an accepting conversation with the form
(a,e,r), which has the same probability distribution as conversations between the
honest P and V on input x.
The special soundness property implies that the error probability of this proof system
is always 2−t .
A Σ-protocol is efficient to prove AND, OR and arbitrary combinations of AND/OR
statements. More details can be found in [39, 42, 112].
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed relevant foundations and preliminaries used in this thesis.
We first introduced algebra and number theory, including group theory, bilinear maps and
algebraic group models. Then we recalled intractable assumptions used in cryptographic
schemes, including DL assumption, DDH assumption and DHE assumption. Finally, we
presented the cryptographic tools used in the subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 3
Traceable Monero
“Cryptocurrency will grow to become one of the most important
ways to pay for things and transfer assets.”
– Kim Dotcom, CEO of MegaUpload
In this chapter, we introduce the details of Traceable Monero protocol to balance the
anonymity and traceability in cryptocurrencies. Part of the content in this chapter ap-
peared in [82].
3.1 Introduction
Cryptocurrency is a digital currency whose security is mainly based on public-key
cryptography. Unlike traditional centralised system [83, 126] that suffers from issues
of scalability and delay, cryptocurrency systems are decentralised, which enable two par-
ties to conduct transactions directly. The trading and verification of cryptocurrencies are
achieved through a blockchain [97, 128]. Protecting users’ privacy is one of the most
enticing features of cryptocurrencies. If transactions are not conducted anonymously, a
malicious merchant may sell customers’ transaction information to third parties for finan-
cial benefit. The loss of privacy in cryptocurrency transactions may eventually lead to
spam and other harassment in a user’s daily life.
Monero (XMR) a is an open-sourced and decentralised cryptocurrency that mainly fo-
cuses on privacy and anonymity. It was launched in 2014 and has been one of the largest
ahttp://monero.org/.
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cryptocurrencies with a market capitalisation of 9.8 billion US dollars (Mar. 2021). Mon-
ero protects payee’s identity based on CryptoNote protocol [123] and takes advantage
of the linkable ring signature [87], which is known as Ring Confidential Transactions
(RingCT) protocol [99].
Anonymity is a desirable requirement to preserve users’ privacy in cryptocurrency
transactions. Unfortunately, anonymity makes investigating illegal transactions more dif-
ficult. More specifically, anonymity in cryptocurrencies provides a cover for various illicit
activities, such as money laundering, contraband trading and extortion, as the adversaries
are hard to be identified and punished. The abuse of anonymous cryptocurrencies for
illegal purposes is on the rise in recent years.
In 2017, the worldwide cyberattack WannaCrybc hacked more than 300,000 computers
across 150 countries by encrypting files and asking for money to ransom them. Victims
were required to pay $300 - $600 in bitcoin to three hardcoded accounts. It is estimated
that the financial loss caused by WannaCry incident is about 4 billion dollars and the per-
petrators are still unknown. Three months later, the bitcoins paid by victims have been
exchanged for Monero, which utilises the one-time address and is incredibly hard to trace
d. Thus, traceability and the surveillance in anonymous cryptocurrency is of great impor-
tance. Our motivation is to optimally trace an extortionist in anonymous Monero to deter
criminals or simplify investigations when a blackmail event happens. As shown in [117]
(Paragraph 2), when the data are at stake, many people are willing to put aside the privacy
and reveal some necessary information. Just as the example above, the victims in Wan-
naCry would have enough incentive to adopt the system of anonymous cryptocurrency
with traceability.
3.2 Related works
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3.2.1 Anonymity in cryptocurrencies revisited
Bitcoin [97] provides pseudonymity instead of true anonymity [98] of a user, but the
pseudonym mechanism of bitcoin is not sufficiently strong to protect users’ privacy in
some real-world applications. Monero is a secure, private and untraceable cryptocurrency
system. Besides, there are several other cryptocurrencies proposed to enhance the level of
user privacy. Dashe was released in 2014 and is the first privacy-focused cryptocurrency
designed on top of an improved version of bitcoin. PIVXf is the fourth largest privacy-
oriented cryptocurrecy in the sense of market cap. The ecosystem of PIVX is similar to
Dash, and it uses PoS, which requires 10,000 tokens to be the Master Nodes. Lately,
PIVX proposed zPIV, which combines PIVX and zerocoin [94] to receive better privacy.
Verge (XVG) g was proposed in 2014 to improve bitcoin privacy. It uses TOR (The onion
router) and I2P to hide the real IP address. The wraith protocol makes Verge even more
anonymous. Zerocash (Zcash) [111] was proposed in 2014, which leverages a nested
commitment to protect the payer identity as well as the transaction amount, then a ZK-
SNARKs [11] proof is generated to let miners validate the commitment without knowing
the serial number, addresses or the transaction amount. A formal security proof is pro-
vided for Zcash but improving its efficiency is still a challenging problem. In 2017, Sun et
al. [116] proposed a new efficient RingCT protocol (RingCT 2.0), in which accumulators
with one-way domain [6] were employed to significantly save the storage space. More
privacy-enhancing techniques and altcoins to bitcoin can be found in [79][38](section
V-B), such as Mix and Coinjoin.
3.2.2 Traceability in cryptocurrencies revisited
Anonymity may hinder the acceptance and adoption of cryptocurrencies. The anony-
mous nature of cryptocurrency enables some nefarious activities. Moreover, anonymous
cryptocurrencies also suffer criticism from governments. To reduce the abuse of cryp-
tocurrencies for illegal activities, many countries have put the regulation of cryptocur-
rencies on the agenda hi. Blockchain surveillance has received much attention. Some
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Table 3.1: Comparison among privacy-preserving cryptocurrencies
Schemes Payer Privacy Payee Privacy Transaction Amount
Bitcoin Pseudonym Pseudonym N/A
Dash Mix Mix Mix














PIVX zPIV zPIV Common denominations
Verge TOR + I2P TOR + I2P TOR + I2P
who are seeking to monitor cryptocurrencies.
In academia, there are already some anonymity revocation methods in traditional e-
cash. Some e-cash schemes rely on a trusted party in the withdrawal phase that can
bind the customer [66] or in opening an account [24]. Camenisch et al. [23] proposed a
scheme with passive anonymity-revoking trustees based on a fair blind signature. Kulger
et al. [74] proposed a deanonymisation without trusted third parties, which detects illegal
transactions in an audit phase. Lately, a few attempts have been put forward for trace-
ability of cryptocurrencies and the proposed methods mainly fall into the following three
categories:
(1) Based on transaction analysis.
Most existing tracing methods for bitcoin are based on statistical approaches to collect
and analyse the transactions, such as clustering algorithms, group theory and data mining.
The re-use (use the same account in more than one transactions) and co-use (use more than
one accounts in a single transaction) of bitcoin addresses together with their topologies
can be used to match some of the accounts to the same user. Moreover, it is shown
by Barcelol that, with some external information [73, 106], it is possible to find real
identities, such as the shipping addresses in online shopping. Moreno-Sanchez et al.
lhttp://www. dtic. upf.edu/j̃barcelo/papers/20140704 User Privacy in the Public Bitcoin Blockc
hain/paper. pdf
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[95] studied real-time transactions and de-anonymised the transactions in Ripple network
using heuristic clustering to group wallets according to the observations. In 2018, Möser
et al. [96] proposed an empirical analysis for Monero traceability. According to on-chain
transaction and mining pool analysis, 62% transaction input can be deduced. However, for
the aforementioned tracing methods, plenty of transactions are needed to do the statistical
analysis. If a user joined the system for few times, he/she could be identified only with a
small probability.
(2) Based on a central party.
Danezis et al. [40] put forward a cryptocurrency framework called RSCoin, in which
the central banks are required to dominantly control the financial policies and monetary
supply. RSCoin needs distributed authorities called mintettes maintain a blockchain, col-
lect transactions and prevent double-spending of coins. Bank of England has announced
a plan to launch RSCoin and hopes it can gain wider acceptancem. In CCS 2017, Cec-
chetti et al. [30] proposed Solidus, in which several banks maintain all users’ accounts
and manage the transactions on behalf of the users. Users’ anonymity can be ensured in
the bank-intermediated ledgers where senders and receivers cannot be publicly identified,
including pseudonyms. Users can be traced only by their corresponding banks, while
other external entities learn nothing but the identities of the banks. It also conceals the
transaction amount and keeps the transaction graph confidential to resist transaction anal-
ysis. However, in the models mentioned above, the system becomes partially distributed.
UVCoinn, designed to create a more scalable cryptocurrency, relies on central banks to
issue the currencies, which is palatable to governments. It also requires a global transpar-
ent ledger to record the transactions and supports public access. The miners in the system
are mintettes, who are authorised by the bank to collect the transactions rather than doing
PoW. Also, they are accountable for users’ misbehaviour. However, the framework to
involve a central party is not desirable in blockchain system.
(3) Based on cryptographic tools.
The existing tracing methods in this category are very few. For the regulatory pur-
pose, Garman et al. [57] introduced accountable privacy for decentralised anonymous
payment (DAP) protocol, which allows selective user tracing and coin tracing in a trans-
action privacy-preserving policy-enforcement mechanisms. For coin tracing, it is to trace
an output coin, which is a commitment, in a transaction. All the necessary information
to trace a coin is encrypted under a symmetric key and this key is encrypted under the
m2) https://www.bitguru.co.uk/crypto-news/bank-of-england-state-backed-crypto-in-the-works/
nhttps://github.com/UVCoin
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tracing authority’s public key. They took advantage of the accountable tracing signature
for user tracing, which is utilised to let each user encrypt their data under a key assigned
by the tracing authority. They also considered various regulatory policies and showed
how to integrate their mechanisms in Zcash. Note that the tracing mechanisms proposed
in this section fall into this category, with Monero as an underpinning.
3.3 Building blocks
In this section, we list building blocks used in the concrete construction, including
cryptographic accumulators and signature of knowledge.
3.3.1 Accumulators with one-way domain
An accumulator [6] can accumulate a set of elements into a single value and for each
given element, there exists a witness to prove that it has been incorporated into the ac-
cumulator indeed. Specifically, let F = {Fλ} be a sequence of families of functions and
X = {Xλ} a sequence of families of finite sets, which satisfy Fλ = { f : U f ×X f →U f }
and Xλ ⊆ X f for all λ ∈ N. An accumulator family contains the following algorithms.
• ACC.Gen(1λ ). This is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security pa-
rameter λ , and outputs a description desc and some auxiliary information.
• ACC.Eval(desc,X). This is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the de-
scription desc and X ⊂ Xλ . It outputs an accumulated value v = f (u,X), where
f ∈ Fλ ,u ∈U f and f (u,X) = f (· · · f (u,x1) · · ·xn),X = {x1, · · · ,xn} ⊂ Xλ .
• ACC.Wit(desc,x,X). This is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the de-
scription desc, X ⊂ Xλ and x ∈ X . It outputs a witness ω , where v = f (w,x).
An accumulator satisfies the following properties.
• Efficient generation: The ACC.Gen is efficient that runs in polynomial time.
• Efficient evaluation: Any f ∈ Fλ is computable in polynomial time in λ .
• Quasi-commutativity: For all λ ∈ N, f ∈ Fλ , u ∈U f and x1,x2 ∈ Xλ , it holds that
f ( f (u,x1), x2) = f ( f (u,x2),x1).
The pair (F ,X ) is an accumulator with one-way domain if it has the following proper-
ties.
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• Collision-resistance: An accumulator is one-way domain if for all λ ∈ N and an
adversary A ,
Pr
 X ⊂ Xλ ∧ x ∈ X f \X




A ( f ,U f ,u)
≤ negl(λ )
• One-way domain: Let {Yλ},{Rλ} be two sequences of families of sets associated with
{Xλ} and each Rλ is an efficient verifiable, samplable relation over Yλ ×Xλ . It is infeasible
to efficiently compute a witness y′ ∈ Yλ for an x sampled from Xλ with W . Specifically, for
any adversary A ,
Pr
[
(y′,x) ∈ Rλ : (y,x)←W (1λ );y′←A (1λ ,x)
]
≤ negl(λ )
3.3.2 Signature of knowledge
Signature of Knowledge (SoK) for a NP-relation R with the corresponding language
L = {y : ∃x, s.t.(x,y) ∈R} consists of the following algorithms.
• Gen(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ , this algorithm outputs a public parameter
par.
• Sign(m,x,y): On input a message m and a pair (x,y) ∈R, it outputs an SoK π .
• Verf(m,π,y): On input a message m, an SoK π and a statement y, it outputs 0/1.
An SoK is SimExt-secure [32] if it satisfies correctness, simulatability and extractabil-
ity.
Correctness. For any message m and a pair (x,y) ∈R, it holds that
Pr
[





Simulatability. There exists a polynomial-time simulator Sim=(SimGen,SimSign) s.t.
for any PPT adversary A ,
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∣∣∣Pr[b = 1 : (par, td)← SimGen(1λ );b←A Sim(par)]−
Pr[b = 1 : par← Gen(1λ );b←A Sign(par)]
∣∣∣≤ negl(λ )
where td is an additional trapdoor in Sim to simulate the signatures without the witness.
Extractability. There exists an extractor Ext s.t. for any PPT adversary A ,
Pr
 (x,y) ∈R ∨ (m,y) ∈ Q
∨Verf(m,y,π) = 0
:




where Q is a list of queries to SimSign Oracle that A made.
3.3.3 Variant ElGamal encryption
We introduce a variant of the original ElGamal encryption, with the following compo-
nents.
• KeyGen(λ ). On input a security parameter λ , it generates a cyclic group G with
prime order q. g ∈ G is a generator of G. Choose a random x ∈ Z∗q as a secret key,
it outputs the public key as y = gx. The key pair is (x,y)
• Enc(y,m). On input a public key z and a message m, first choose a random r and
encrypt m as C = (c1,c2) = (zr,mgr). The ciphertext of m is (c1,c2).
• Dec(x,C). The entity who has the knowledge of the secret key x can decrypt the
ciphertext and recover the message m as m = c2/c1x
−1
It is shown in [22] that in ElGamal encryption, the public key and the base can be
interchangeable and both schemes are indistinguishable under chosen-plaintext attack
(IND-CPA) secure under DDH assumption. In our construction, it is easy to generate
zero-knowledge proof with the variant ElGamal encryption.
3.4 System model of traceable Monero
In this part, we introduce the system model and system components of Traceable Mon-
ero system.
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3.4.1 System model
As shown in Figure 3.1, four entities, namely, users, a P2P network, a tracing authority
and a blockchain are involved in Traceable Monero. Users include payers and payees
who have long-term addresses. Users generate transactions with a one-time private key
and distribute the transactions in the P2P network. The P2P network consists of a number
of peers, who are supposed to have strong computation power and resources. The peers
can be honest or malicious, but the 51% attack is assumed unworkable in the P2P network.
The peers can behave as miners to generate a block for some valid transactions. Miners are
expected to achieve the Consensus in the system. Peers can also act as users to generate
transactions when a peer needs to transfer some digital currencies to others. The tracing
authority is responsible for tracing a payer in dubious transactions with his private key.
The blockchain is a continuously growing database, which consists of blocks and records
the valid transactions in the P2P network.
3.4.2 System components
Specifically, Traceable Monero system is composed of the following algorithms.
Setup(1λ )→ (pp). On input a security parameter λ ∈ N, it outputs a public parameter
pp of the system.
KeyGen(pp)→ (pk,sk). On input the public parameter pp, it outputs a public-private
key pair (pk,sk).
Mint(pk,a) → (ck,cn). On input an amount a and the public key pk, this algorithm
outputs a coin cn with amount a and the corresponding coin key ck. The coin cn and the
public key pk consist of an account denoted by act = (pk,cn). And the corresponding
account secret key is defined as ask = (sk,ck).
Spend(m,Ks,As,A,R, pkM)→ (tx,π,S,CT ). On input a group of spending addresses As
together with the corresponding group of secret key Ks, a set of groups of input addresses
A including As, a set of output address R, some transaction descriptions m ∈ {0,1}∗ and
tracing authority’s public key pkM, this algorithm outputs a transaction tx, a proof π , a set
of serial number S and a ciphertext CT .
Verify(tx,π,S,CT ) → (0/1). On input the transaction tx, the proof π , the set of serial
numbers S and the cipertext CT , this algorithm checks the transaction is valid or not and
outputs 1 or 0.
BlockGen({tx}, blkn−1) → (non,blkn). On input a set of transactions {tx} and the
previous block blkn−1, this algorithm outputs a nonce non and a block blkn.
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BlockVer(blkn)→ (1/0). On input the current block blkn, this algorithm verifies whether
the block is valid or not and outputs 1 or 0.
Trace(skM, tx,CT ) → (pks,ψ). On input the tracing authority’s secret key skM, the
transaction tx and the ciphertext CT , it outputs the payer’s public key pks and a tracing
proof ψ .
Judge(pks,ψ, pkM,CT )→ (0/1). On input the payer’s public key pks, the tracing proof
ψ , the tracing authority’s public key pkM and the ciphertext CT , this algorithm checks
whether the tracing proof is valid and outputs 1 or 0.
Figure 3.1: System model of Traceable Monero
3.5 Properties of Traceable Monero
Regarding the security of Traceable Monero, we assume the involved P2P network
in the system is secure and reliable, which can resist the common attacks such as Sybil
attack, selfish mining attack etc. In practice, we can employ the P2P network of Monero as
the P2P network of Traceable Monero. Thus, we only focus on the security issues related
to the transactions. Below we first present the security threats to traceable Monero, and
then introduce the formal security definitions.
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3.5.1 Threat model
As analysed above, focusing on secure transactions, we assume an adversary may
launch the following attacks [116] in Traceable Monero.
Double-Spending Attack: Double-spending attack says that the money in an account
is spent in more than one transaction.
Over-Spending Attack: Over-spending attack attempts to spend a larger amount of
money than that in an account in a transaction.
Anonymity Attack: Anonymity attack is that one can identify the payer in a transac-
tion without tracing authority’s private key.
Forgery Attack: Forgery attack indicates that a malicious payer can spend money in
the accounts without his control. That is, to forge a transaction without the corresponding
private key of an account.
Linkability Attack: Linkability attack states that two transactions issued by the same
payer can be linked without tracing authority’s private key. Note that linking two trans-
actions performed by the same payer is easier than identifying the payer in those transac-
tions.
Traceability Attack: Traceability attack is that a payer successfully conducts a trans-
action but cannot be identified by the tracing authority.
3.5.2 Security model
In this subsection, we formalise the security model, whose goal is Balance. Balance
aims to cover over-spending attack, double-spending attack and forgery attack. Formal
security definitions of Traceable Monero are defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Balance [116]). Balance requires that a malicious payer cannot (1) spend
the money more than that in his account and (2) spend the money without his control. A















in which the definitions of the oracles AddGen, ActGen, Spend and Corrupt are as follows:
• AddGen(i): On input a query number i, pick a randomness τi, run algorithm
(ski, pki)← KeyGen(pp;τi) and return an address pki.
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• ActGen(i,ai): On input an address index i and an amount ai, run algorithm (cni,cki)
←Mint(pki,ai), then add i and account acti = (pki,cni) to initially empty lists I
and G , respectively, and output (acti,cki) for pki, where pki was generated by Ad-
dGen.
• Spend(m,As,A,R, pkM): On input a transaction string m, input addresses A con-
taining As and output addresses R, run (tx,π,S,CT )← Spend(m, ,Ks,As,A,R, pkM)
and return (tx,π,S,CT ) after adding it to list T . We presume at least one of the
addresses in As has not been corrupted.
• Corrupt(i): On input a query number i ∈ I , determine the serial number si of
account acti with address pki using account secret key aski, then add si and (si,ai)
to lists C and B, respectively, where ai is the amount of the account with address
pki, and finally return τi.




2, · · · ,act
′
µ ,S1,
mathcalS2, · · · ,Sv) such that Si =(txi,πi,Si,CTi), where all spends are payed to, w.l.o.g.,
the challenger with address pkc, i.e., txi = (mi,Ai,A{pkc}) for all i ∈ [v]. A wins the game
if her outputs satisfy the following conditions:
1. Verify(txi,πi,Si,CTi) = 1 for all i ∈ [v].
2. Si /∈T ∧Si ⊂S for all i ∈ [v], and S j∩Sk = /0 for any different j,k ∈ [v].








ai, j : (si, j,ai, j) ∈ B ∧ si, j ∈ Si ∩C
}
, it holds that
∑ai, j∈E ai, j < ∑
v
i=1 aout,i, where aout,i denotes the balance of an output account in Si.
3.5.3 Other desirable properties
In this subsection, we list several other required properties of the Traceable Monero, in-
cluding Perfect Correctness, Anonymity and Traceability, in which Anonymity is to resist
linkability attack and anonymity attack and Traceability is for against traceability attack.
Formal definitions of these properties are defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Perfect Correctness). All transactions generated by Spend can be ac-
cepted by Verify and any proof produced by Trace can pass Judge. Formally, a Traceable
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CT ) = 1
Judge(pks,ψ, pkM,










Definition 3.3 (Anonymity). A Traceable Monero is anonymous if for all PPT adver-
saries A = (A1,A2), it holds that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr

b′ = b :
pp← Setup(1λ );(m,As0 ,As1 ,A,R)←
A AddGen,ActGen,Spend,Corrupt,Trace1 (pp);
b←{0,1} ,(tx∗,π∗,S∗,CT ∗)←









where all oracles are defined as before, Asi ∈ A and Asi ⊂ G for i ∈ {0,1} and Trace
oracle is defined as follows.
• Trace(tx,π)o. This is an oracle that on query a transaction tx together with a proof
π , it returns a public key pks. If the query (tx,π) is the challenging pair, then the
oracle returns ⊥.
Besides, the following conditional also needs to be satisfied:
– For all i ∈ {0,1}, none of the accounts in Asi have been corrupted.
– No query in the form of (·,As, ·, ·) s.t. As∩Asi 6= /0 has been issued to Spend oracle.
Definition 3.4 (Traceability). Traceability ensures that the tracing authority can always
successfully trace the real payer, who conducted the transaction, and the tracing authority
can generate a valid proof to this trace for public verification. A protocol has the property
oWe note that tx contains transaction description m, the input address set A and output address R, as
defined in system component
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of traceability if for any PPT adversary A ,
Pr
 Trace(skM, tx,CT ) = (pks,ψ)




Verify(tx,π,S,CT ) = 1
≤ negl(λ ).
3.6 Traceable Monero system
In this section, we firstly introduce how the proposed Traceable Monero system works,
and then describe the concrete protocol of the proposed Traceable Monero and finally
give an instantiation of the Signature of Knowledge used in the system.
3.6.1 Workflow of Traceable Monero
The proposed Traceable Monero system is based on an improved Monero. As shown in
Figure 3.2, the main processes of the proposed Traceable Monero system are transaction
generation, transaction on chain and tracing.
• Transaction generation: To launch a transaction (spending), a payer needs to gen-
erate keys and mint coins first. When generating one-time key pairs for a payee, a
tag is also produced for each one-time address, which is used to trace the long-term
public key of the payee when he acts as a malicious payer. Every payer and payee
involved in a transaction have their own tags, where a payee’s tag is computed by
his/her payer in the current transaction and a payer’s tag is generated in the previ-
ous transaction when he was a payee. To mint a coin for a one-time address before
conducting a transaction, the payer needs to compute a homomorphic commitment
with the currency amount and a random number to hide the amount of currency in a
transaction. A payer employs a linkable ring signature to sign the transaction with
his one-time secret key to hide his identity and broadcasts the transaction T x into
the P2P network.
• Transaction on chain: This part is the same as the underlying Monerop. Specif-
ically, when miners receive the transaction generated by the users in the system,
they validate the transactions first and generate a block for the valid transactions
he collects. Then, the miners compete to broadcast a block on the blockchain via
phttps://getmonero.org/
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Consensus, say proof-of-work. Anyone can validate the correctness of the proof-
of-work efficiently.
• Tracing: To trace the long-term public key of a payer, the tracing authority decrypts
the ciphertext in the tag using his own private key to obtain the payer’s long-term
public key. When tracing a one-time address of a payer, the tracing authority de-
crypts the ciphertext in the transaction and gets the index s in a ring, and thus can
find the corresponding one-time public keys. Moreover, with the exposure of a real
input (i.e., paying) account, the tracing authority can trace back to the accounts,
from which the money is transferred to the current account, and trace forward, to
locate the subsequent accounts that receive payment originated from the current
account and thus the tracing authority can trace the money flow.
3.6.2 Traceable Monero construction
A concrete construction is presented in this part, in which several cryptographic build-
ing blocks are leveraged.
Suppose there are n groups of input accounts A = {(pk(k)in,i,cn
(k)
in,i)}1≤i≤n,1≤k≤m in the
sytem and the real payer is the s-th group denoted by As = {(pk(k)in,s,cn
(k)
in,s)}1≤k≤m. The
public keys in the accounts can be regarded as a matrix with each group of public keys in
a column and each row k of the public keys being accumulated into a single value vk by an
accumulator f . Each group of public keys are set as {pk(k)in,i ·ui}. An extra row of p̃ki ·ui is
computed in the last line of the matrix to guarantee the total balance in each transaction.
Traceable Monero system. Define f= (ACC.Gen, ACC.Eval,ACC.Wit) as an accumu-
lator with one-way domain Gq and SoK=(SoK.Gen,SoK.Sign,SoK.Verf) as a signature of
knowledge. The concrete protocol is defined as follows on the basis of the underlying f
and SoK.
Setup(1λ ). Let the description of the accumulator be desc = ACC.Gen(1λ ) and denote
par as par = SoK.Gen(1λ ). Choose h0,h1,h3, h̃,u ∈ Gq randomly and the public param-
eter is pp = (1λ ,desc,par,h0,h1,h3, h̃,u,H), where H : {0,1}∗→ Gq denotes a collision
resistant hash functionq.
KeyGen(pp). This algorithm generates public keys as users’ addresses in the system as
follows. Let (ω ∈ Gq,z = h0ω) be the key pair of the tracing authority. A payer wants to
qWe note that the parameters h0,h1,h3 can be generated as hi = H(‘traceable monero i′), which are
publicly verifiable.































































Figure 3.2: Workflow of the proposed Traceable Monero
3.6. TRACEABLE MONERO SYSTEM 41




), where the pair (a′,b′)
is the corresponding long-term private key. When pay to the payee, the payer generates a
one-time public key as well as a corresponding tag for the payee. Specifically, to generate





,B′). The payee’s one-time public key is y = B′h0h, and the corresponding
one-time private key is x = b′+H(R′a
′
,B′). To produce a tag, the payer first encrypts
the payee’s long-term public key B′ with tracing authority’s public key z using variant










∧ y = B′ih0H(A
′
i





where len is the number of accounts chosen by the payer to hide the real account in the
‘OR’ proof.
In the above setting, in order to trace the real spender with the help of the tags, we
modified the underlying CryptoNote to add the part of the public key B′ into the hash
function H. By doing so, the payee can still recover the corresponding private key and
the payer can bind (A′,B′) with the one-time key y, as it is hard to find another (A′′,B′′)
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Hash01 Hash23
Figure 3.3: Generating one-time address
Mint(pk,a). This algorithm mints a coin for a public key address with an amount
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a as follows. Pick a random r ∈ Zq, and compute Pedersen commitment c with the
amount a and the randomness r as c = Com(ctk,a;r) = h0rh1a. The output is (cn,ck) =
(c,(r,a)). We denote the account as act = (pk,cn), and the corresponding secret key is
ask = (sk,ck).
Spend(m,Ks,As,A,R,z). Without loss of generality, we define the following parame-











output address be R = {pkout, j}1≤ j≤t . To spend a coin, a payer needs to do the following,
1. The payer chooses a random rout, j ∈ Zp(1 ≤ j≤ t) and mints the coin for an out-
put address pkout, j ∈ R(1 ≤ j ≤ t) as cnout, j = cout, j = Com(ctk,aout, j;rout, j) =




j=1 aout, j. The payer adds the output account
actout, j = (pkout, j,cnout, j) to AR, and sends the coin key ckout, j = (rout, j,aout, j) to
the payee holding address pkout, j.


























j=1 aout, j holds.
3. The payer generates a proof π to show that the transaction is spent properly as
follows. The payer computes the accumulated value vk =ACC.Eval(desc,{y
(k)
i ·ui})
and the witness w(k)s = ACC.Wit(desc,{y(k)i · ui|i 6= s}) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m+ 1 to show
that z(k)s = y
(k)
s ·us is indeed accumulated in vk. For 1≤ k ≤ m, the payer computes
sk = h̃x
(k)
s according to the secret key x(k)s of the account as the serial number to
uniquely defined the address. Choose a random ã, and encrypt the index γ with
tracing authority’s public key z as ct1 = zã,ct2 = h
γ
3h0
ã. The ciphertext is CT =
(ct1,ct2). Then invoke Sign algorithm to produce SoK π on tx as follows.
SoK

({ωk,zk,xk}mk=1,γ, ã) : ct1 = zã∧ ct2 = h3
γh0ã∧
f (ωm+1,zm+1) = vm+1∧ zm+1 = h0xm+1uγ∧
f (ω1,z1) = v1∧ z1 = h0x1uγ ∧ s1 = h̃x1∧
...
f (ωm,zm) = vm∧ zm = h0xmuγ ∧ sm = h̃xm

(tx)
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Finally, output (tx,π,S,CT ), where S = {s1,s2, · · · , sm} and CT = (ct1,ct2).
Verify(tx,π,S,CT ). Given A= {(pk(k)in,i, cn
(k)
in,i)}1≤i≤n, 1≤k≤m, AR =(pkout, j,cnout, j)1≤ j≤t ,



















vm+1 = ACC.Eval(desc,{p̃ki ·ui}).
Then verify the SoK with (v1, · · · ,vm+1), serial number S, transaction tx and proof π by
checking
Verf(tx,ct1,ct2,(v1, · · · ,vm+1,s1, · · · ,sm),π)
?
= 1.
BlockGen({tx}, blkn−1)→(non,blkn)r. A miner collects some valid transactions in the
P2P network and generates a Merkle Hash Tree for those transactions. Then the miner
includes the root of the Merkle Hash Tree Root together with the hash of the previous
block Pre Hash in the current block. Finally, the miner needs to compute a proper nonce
non to make the hash of the block less than some target value.
BlockVer(blkn)→(1/0). On input the current block blkn, the miners in the P2P network
check whether the hash value of the block is less than the target value and output 1 or 0.
Trace(ω, tx,CT ). Two tracing mechanisms are provided in this system. One is to trace
one-time public key and the other one is to trace long-term public key as a supplement,
which are shown as follows.
• To trace a one-time public key by given the ciphertext CT = (ct1,ct2) from a trans-
action tx, the tracing authority decrypts the ciphertext using his secret key ω by
computing p = ct2/ct1ω
−1
. Then he tries to find γ ∈ [1,n] by testing which γ sat-
isfies p = h3γ , and then the corresponding public key can be traced. By producing
a proof ψ ′ as SoK
{





(γ), the tracing authority can
prove himself that γ is indeed the index of the payer in the group.
• To trace a long-term public key, the tracing authority decrypts the tag by computing
B′ = y/ct ′ω
−1
and thus can get the corresponding long-term public key B′. By
rNote that this algorithm and BlockVer are the same as the underlying Monero. We put them here to
make the whole construction self-contained. More details can be found at https://getmonero.org/ and [99]
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producing the SoK
{
(ω) : z= h0ω ∧ct ′=
( y
B′
)ω } as a proof ψ , the tracing authority
can prove that the tag is opened correctly by the authority himself and Bi is indeed
the payer. Note that the proof ψ can be publicly verified.
Judge(pks,ψ(ψ ′),z,CT ). On input the payer’s public key, the proof generated by the
tracing authority, the tracing authority’s public key z and the ciphertext, anyone can vali-






In this subsection, we show some extensions of our construction.
Sharing tracing capability. To avoid single point of failure, authority’s tracing ca-
pability of the can be shared among several authorities according to an access structure
[129], such that a qualified subset of the authorities can trace suspicious transactions. In
this case, we provide a set of tracing authorities, in which users may not trust all of them,
but can choose the subset of the Tracing Authorities they believe in to conduct the tracing.
An easy way to achieve this is shown as follows. Suppose there are n Tracing Authori-
ties whose public key is z1 = h0ω1 , · · · ,zn = h0ωn , the payer can choose t out of n Tracing
Authorities and aggregate their public key into a single z = ∏ti=1 zt . Then the t Tracing
Authorities can decrypt to reveal the payer when tracing is needed.
Permissioned blockcahin. The blockchain in our system is a public blockchain, and
we also consider the permissioned blockchain, such as consortium blockchain, which can
be a ledger among members (e.g. banks). More specifically, in the consortium blockchain,
each bank can generate transactions on the chain but can hide their transaction metadata
from other banks, and a tracing authority is required by regulation to determine illegal
transactions, such as money laundering. In this way, the tracing result can be linked to the
real-world identity and the lawbreaker can be punished.
3.6.4 Instantiation of the SoK
The SoK mentioned in subsection 4.4 can be instantiated by Fiat-Shamir paradigm
[52] incorporated with zero-knowledge protocols in [6]. For the SoK in KeyGen, the
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instantiation of h in the proof needs to employ ZK-SNARK [11]. For the SoK in Spend,
more details are shown below.
For simplicity, we use the symmetric bilinear pairing in our construction. Let g0,g1,g2
be generators of group G1 and h0,h1,h2, h3, h̃,u be generators of Gq, which is a subgroup
of Z∗p. Firstly, PoK1 is to prove the knowledge of (xk,zk,γ, ã) s.t. zk = h0
xk · uγ ,sk =
h̃xk ,ct1 = zã and ct2 = h3γgã in a zero-knowledge approach. Specifically, we have,
PoK1
{
(xk,zk,rk, t,γ, ã) : Ck = g0zkg1rk ∧ zk = h0xk ·uγ∧
sk = h̃xk ∧D = h1γh2t ∧ ct1 = zã∧ ct2 = h3γgã
}
This protocol can be split into the following two sub-protocols,
PoK1,1{(zk,rk) : Ck = g0zkg1rk}
PoK1,2
{
(xk,rk, t,γ,a) :Ck = g0h0
xk ·uγ g1rk ∧ sk = h̃xk∧
D = h1γh2t∧ct1 = zã∧ ct2 = h3γgã
}
The first protocol is a standard protocol to prove the discrete logarithm of a statement
while the second one is to prove the knowledge of a double discrete logarithm [22].
Secondly, PoK2 is to show that zk is indeed accumulated in the value vk without leaking
any knowledge of zk and its witness wk. Specifically, we have,
PoK2
{
(wk,zk,rk) : e(wk,g0zkg0α) = e(vk,g0)∧Ck = g0zkg1rk
}
To instantiate PoK2, we choose τ1,τ2 ∈ Zp, compute wk,1 = g0τ1g1τ2,wk,2 =wkg1τ1 , and
implement the following PoK,
PoK′2
{






τ1 ∧Ck = g0zkg1rk
}
where δ1 = τ1zk and δ2 = τ2zk.
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3.7 Security proofs
In this section, we provide detailed security proofs of balance, anonymity and trace-
ability of the proposed scheme.
3.7.1 Proof of balance
Theorem 3.1. The proposed Traceable Monero achieves the property of balance if DL as-
sumption holds, ACC is an accumulator with one-way domain and SoK is SimExt-secure.
Proof (Sketch). We borrowed the idea from [116] to achieve the proof. If there is an
adversary A that breaks the balance of the proposal with a non-negligible probability ε ,
then we can construct another algorithm A ′ to solve DL problem.
Given a DL instance (h0,h1 = gα ), A ′ runs ACC.Gen(1λ ) and Gen(1λ ) to generates
desc and par. Then choose β and γ randomly to compute h̃ = h0β and h3 = h0γ . A
can make queries to AddGen, ActGen and Corrupt Oracles for at most qad , qac and qco
times, respectively. A ′ chooses xi for each i ∈ [qad]. A ′ chooses a j∗ ∈ [qad], and sets
the queried addresses as follows. For i 6= j∗, pki = h0xi and for i = j∗, pki = h1xi . Now B
simulates the following oracles.
• AddGen(i). Return the address pki generated as the way mentioned above for the
i-th query.
• ActGen(i,ai). Given i and an amount ai, choose a random ri and set ci = h0rih1ai .
Add (cni,cki) = (ci,(ri,ai)) to list I , i,acti = (pki,cni) to list G and si = h̃ski to list
S , respectively.
• Spend(m,As,A,R). Given the inputs, A ′ generates (tx,π,S) as the way in the pro-
posal if act j∗ 6∈ As. Otherwise, A ′ generates π by simulating SoK. Specifically, A ′
invokes Sim and generates the simulated spending without using the witness, which
is indistinguishable from A ’s view.
• Corrupt(i). On input the query i, if i = j∗, then A ′ aborts. Otherwise, B returns xi
and puts si as well as (si,ai) to list C and B.
Finally, A outputs (act ′1, · · · ,act ′µ ,S1, · · · ,Sv), where Si = (txi,πi,Si) and all trans-
actions are paid to A ′.
Now let’s see the way to solve a DL instance if A wins the game above. We denote
Ei = {ai, j : (si, j,zi, j) ∈B∧ si, j ∈Si∩C } for simplicity.
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• Case 1: ∀i∈ [v], Si\C =∅. From the winning condition ∑ai, j∈E ai, j <∑avi=1∈E aout,i,
we know that there exists some i∗ ∈ [v] s.t. ∑ai∗, j∈Ei∗ ai∗, j < ∑avi=1∈E aout,i∗ . From the
serial number, we can find the group {acti∗, j} of the spent accounts in Ai∗ , where
acti∗, j = (pki∗, j,cni∗, j) and the secret key is aski∗, j = (ski∗, j,(ri∗, j,ai∗, j)). Then we


























We also know from the definition that Si 6∈T for all i ∈ [v], thus we can use Ext to
extract a witness ({(
xi∗, j,zi∗, j,ski∗, j
)}m
j=1 ,(w̃i∗, z̃i∗, s̃ki∗),γi∗
)
.
















• Case 2: ∀i∈ [v], Si\C 6=∅. Let J = {i∈ [v] : Si\C 6=∅}, SJ =
⋃
i∈J (Si\C )
and the size of Si\C is li. Then check if s j∗ ∈SJ . If so, there exists i∗ ∈J s.t
s j∗ ∈Si∗ . Now we can extract a witness including sk j∗ s.t. pk j∗ = h0sk j∗ = αx j∗ .
Thus the DL problem can be solved by computing α = sk j∗/x j∗ .
Thus, the proof is completed.
3.7.2 Proof of anonymity
In this subsection, we describe the proof of anonymity.
Theorem 3.2. The proposed Traceable Monero achieves the property of anonymity if the
SoK satisfies extractability, homomorphic commitment is perfect hiding, DDH assumption
holds and encryption scheme is IND-CPA.
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Proof. We make use of game-based framework [115] to present our proofs. We denote
Pr[Wini] as the winning probability of an adversary (guessing correctly) in Gamei [116].
The details of each game are shown as follows.
Game 0. This is the challenge game defined in section 3.4 (cf. Definition 3.3) and




2 , · · · ,s
(b)
m ) and C∗ = (ct1,ct
(b)
2 ). A outputs a guess b
′, from subsection 3.5, we
can easily get
Pr[Win0] = Pr[b′ = b]
Game 1. Game 1 is the same as Game 0 with one difference. The simulator replaces
the algorithm Gen by SimGen to generate par and Sign by SimSign to generate the SoK.
The Spend and challenge queries are computed without using the witness. Specifically,
for a challenge query (m,As0,As1,A,R), the simulator calculates the statement and the








1 , · · · ,s
(b)
m ))
without the knowledge of the witness. Clearly, if there is a difference in the adversary’s
winning probability between Game 0 and Game 1, then the adversary can be used to
construct an algorithm to violate SimExt of SoK. The adversary’s winning probability in
Game 1 satisfies the following equation due to the SimExt security of our employed SoK,
where λ is the security parameter of this system.
|Pr[Win1]−Pr[Win0]| ≤ negl(λ )
Game 2. Game 2 is the same as Game 1 with one difference. During the challenge
phase, the simulator chooses the output address pkout, j ∈ R randomly and uniformly.
Specifically, the simulator sets h1 = hα0 for some randomness α and changes the output
address pkout, j by picking a random r̂ j from Zp and setting cnout, j = h0r̂ j for 1 ≤ j ≤ t.















is independent of b and so is vm+1 = ACC.Eval(desc,{p̃ki · ui}ni=1). Clearly, if there is
a difference in the adversary’s winning probability between Game 1 and Game 2, we
can use the adversary to construct an algorithm to break the perfect hiding property of
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homomorphic commitment. The adversary’s winning probability in Game 2 satisfies
Pr[Win2] = Pr[Win1]
Game 3. Game 3 is the same as Game 2 with one difference. The simulator changes
the setting of the serial numbers when answering the challenging queries by choosing sk
(k ∈ [m]) randomly from Gq. We claim that no accounts in Asb is corrupted and no spend
queries (m,As,A,R) s.t. As
⋂
Asb = φ is permitted, so the serial numbers S∗ = (s1, · · · ,sm)
are fresh to the adversary. Clearly, the serial numbers are uniformly distributed from the
adversary’s view if DDH assumption holds. That is to say, if there is a difference in the
adversary’s winning probability between Game 2 and Game 3, we can use the adversary
to construct an algorithm to break the DDH problem. The adversary’s winning probability
in Game 3 satisfies
|Pr[Win3]−Pr[Win2]| ≤ negl(λ )
Game 4. Game 4 is the same as Game 3 with one difference. The simulator changes
the ciphertext CT by encrypting a random number ξ . More specifically, the simulator
sets ct1 = za,ct2 = h3ξ ga, where a is also a random element. When answering a query,
the simulator modifies Trace oracle into Trace’ such that the simulator can run Ext to
extract the public key pk from the SoK instead of decrypting the ciphertext. If the queried
transaction tx is in the list T , then the index can be returned by looking up the list.
Otherwise, the simulator can get a witness by the SimExt security of the SoK. Then by
IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme, the simulator can get a unique public key
as a response. Clearly, if there is a difference in the adversary’s winning probability
between Game 3 and Game 4, we can use the adversary to construct an algorithm to
violate SimExt of SoK and IND-CPA of the encryption scheme. The adversary’s winning
probability in Game 4 satisfies
|Pr[Win4]−Pr[Win3]| ≤ negl(λ )
Wrapping up. The security analysis above shows that, the challenge transaction
(tx∗,π∗,S∗,C∗) is independent of b if SoK is SimExt secure, the encryption scheme is
IND-CPA secure and DDH assumption holds, thus this setting leaks no information about
b to the adversary. There is only a negligible difference in winning probability for an ad-
versary between Game 0 and Game 4. So the probability of A in winning the Anonymity
game is 12 + ε , where ε is negligible.
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3.7.3 Proof of traceability
In this subsection, we show the security proof of traceability.
Theorem 3.3. The proposed Traceable Monero achieves traceability if the SoK in the
construction is sound and the encryption and SoK is with perfect correctness.
Proof. Take one wallet from the ring as an example to prove the traceability. If the SoK π
of the transaction tx in Spend algorithm is valid and sound, it implies that ct1 and ct2 are
in the required form, thus the perfect correctness property of the leveraged public-key en-
cryption scheme guarantees h3γ could be uniquely recovered. Moreover, γ is the index of
the one-time public key in the ring, which is a small set and can be identified easily. Once
the one-time public key y is decided, by the soundness of SoK in KeyGen, we can extract
the element r′ and the key pair (A′i,B
′
i) and R
′,y,ct are in the required form. We now need
to prove that given a one-time key y = B′ih0
H(Ai′r
′
,Bi′), it is computational infeasible to find
another key pair (A′′i ,B
′′




r′ ,Bi′′). We can see from
the equation that, for a fixed y, one can choose an arbitrary B′′i , and the possibility to find
a A′′i s.t. logh0(y/B
′′
i ) = H(A
′′
i
r′,Bi′′) is negligible, if we treat the hash function H as a
random oracle. In this way we say that the (A′i,B
′
i) in this proof should be the real payee
chosen by the payer. And from the correctness of variant ElGamal encryption, we can en-
sure that the decryption is correct, which means we can get B′ = y/ct ′x
−1
. The other part
of Trace output is an SoK ψ as a proof generated by the racing authority with his private
key to show that the tracing output is generated correctly according to the protocol. From
the correctness and soundness of the SoK scheme, the proof ψ can be verified correctly.
Thus our proposal achieves traceability if SoK is sound as well as the encryption scheme
and SoK are with perfect correctness.
3.8 Performance of the system
In this section, we first analyse the computation and communication overhead, and then
we illustrate the implementation results.
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3.8.1 Theoretical analysis
We first show the efficiency analysis of our proposed Traceable Monero system, then
provide a comparison of the efficiency between our construction and that of the Monero.
The parameters in Table 3.2 are as follows. m: the number of input accounts in each
group; n: the number of group of input accounts; l: the length of the element in group
Zp; exp1: an exponentiation operation in group G1; expT : an exponentiation operation in
group GT ; expq: an exponentiation operation in group Gq ⊂ Zp; |G1|: the length of the
element in group G1, similarly for |Zp|, |Gq| and |GT |.
Table 3.2: Computational cost of our protocol and RingCT 2.0 [116]
Scheme [116] Ours
Spender
((n−1)+1)(m+1) · exp1 ((n−1)+1)(m+1) · exp1
+(m+1) · expT +(m+1) · p +(m+1) · expT +(m+1) · p
+1.2l(m+1) · expq +1.2l(m+1) · expq
Verifier
3.4l(m+1) · expq 5.6l(m+1) · expq
(4.2+n+1.2l)(m+1) · exp1 (4.2+n+1.2l)(m+1) · exp1
4(m+1) · expT +3(m+1) · p 4(m+1) · expT +3(m+1) · p
Communication
(l +4)(m+1)|G1| (l +4)(m+1)|G1|
(3l +8)(m+1)|Zp| (5l +8)(m+1)|Zp|
3l(m+1)|Gq|+(m+1)|GT | 3l(m+1)|Gq|+(m+1)|GT |
In Table 3.2, we only pay attention to the expensive operations in the schemes, includ-
ing exponentiation, multi-exponentiation and bilinear pairing, which are mainly involved
in computing an accumulator and an SoK, and ignore the cost of other light computations.
We count the operations in a concrete instantiation of SoK based on Fiat-Shamir frame-
work [52]. We also take advantage of the trick the pre-computation, and neglect the time-
consumption of the operations that can be pre-computed. For example, ωk,1 = g0τ1g
τ2
1 and
e(g1,g0)α in PoK′2 can be pre-computed, since the elements in these equations are public
parameters or can be selected by the payer in advance.
The details of the result are as follows. For a payer, ((n− 1)+ 1)(m+ 1) · exp1 is re-
quired in the computation of an accumulator, in which for each 1≤ k≤m+1, (n−1)exp1
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is needed in the computation of a witness, and one exp1 to compute the accumulator vk
with the witness. Note that the cost of computing a mult − exp is not equal to that of
the n times of an exp operation, but relies on the specific n. For example, a double-
exponentiation has a cost of about 1.2 times, rather than 2 times, that of a single expo-
nentiation by taking advantage of Shamir’s Simultaneous Squaring Multi-Exponentiation
Algorithm [49] and a triple-exponentiation has a cost of about 1.5 times that of a single
exponentiation [20]. Besides, it needs (m+ 1) expT and (m+ 1) pairing in PoK′2 and
1.2 l(m+ 1) expq in PoK1,2, where l is involved because the double discrete logarithm
in PoK1,2 needs to be committed in bits. All the other operations in SoK can be pre-
computed. The cost of a verifier is mainly on the operations of verifying a response in
SoK and vk. For the communication cost, we count the parameters that need to be stored
and transferred to a verifier in SoK. We can see from table 3.2, the efficiency of Traceable
Monero is comparable to that of the underlying Monero [116].
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Figure 3.4: Overhead of Spend and Verify
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3.8.2 Implementation results
The implementation results are reported as follows. All the algorithms are conducted
on a desktop with 64-bit Win 10 operating system and 16.0 GB RAM. The processor is
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU @ 3.6 GHz. The programs are written in C++ language
with Visual Studio 2010 compiler. We invoke interfaces in Miracl library [113] to realise
the operations in big integer and elliptic curve groups. Tate Pairing is used to implement
an asymmetric bilinear maps, e : G1×G2→GT , where |G1|= |G2|= order, where order
is a 1024-bit prime. For each algorithm, we executed 100 times and get an average running
time.
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Figure 3.5: Time consumption of Verify
We first test the overhead (additional time consumption) in Spendt and Verify protocol
compared to the underlying RingCT 2.0. And we can see from Figure 3.4 that the over-
head in Spend and Verify are almost constant, i.e., 0.70 ms and 1.07 ms, respectively. This
sWe note that symmetric bilinear maps are also suitable in this implementation, however, the operations
in asymmetric bilinear groups are more efficient.
tFor the overhead in Spend protocol, we only consider the time to spend a coin rather than to mint a
coin.
54 CHAPTER 3. TRACEABLE MONERO
is consistent with our empirical analysis, as the overhead is for generating and verifying
the encryption on the column number γ , which doesn’t rely on the number of the input
accounts. We also test the efficiency of Verify protocol, which is much more important,
since Spend protocol is executed only once in a transaction but Verify protocol can be run
many times. The result is shown in Figure 3.5. The time cost grows with the increase of
the number of input accounts. This is in accordance with our scheme, as the effect of the
mixins is eliminated by leveraging the accumulators with one-way domain, and the num-
ber of input accounts affects the number of zero-knowledge proof in Verify. For tracing
authority to identify the long-term public key and one-time public key, it takes only 6.331
ms.
3.9 Summary
Accountability and anonymity are two fundamental dichotomies of security require-
ments in cryptocurrency transactions. Monero provides a high level of anonymity for
both users and their transactions. However, user accountability (or traceability) is un-
fortunately lacking in the current Monero system. In this chapter, we filled this gap by
introducing Traceable Monero, a new cryptocurrency system that can achieve conditional
anonymity and traceability in Monero simultaneously. Our framework relies on a trac-
ing authority, but is optimistic, meaning that it will not interfere with any transaction and
is involved only when investigation is required. We formalised the system model and
the security model of Traceable Monero, including balance, anonymity and traceabil-
ity. We instantiated Traceable Monero, in which we proposed two tracing mechanisms
atop an improved Monero, and proved that the proposed system achieves all the security
requirements in the formalised security model. We implemented the proposed scheme.
The performance analysis and experimental results demonstrate that the proposed system




“Democracy is about voting and it’s about a majority vote.
And it’s time that we started exercising the Democratic”
– Debbie Stabenow
In this chapter, we introduce the details to build a blockchain-based self-tallying voting
system. Part of the content in this chapter appeared in [80].
4.1 Introduction
Voting machines are resource-constraint devices, which can be regarded as IoT de-
vices. Voting machines are one of the most widely used smart devices in IoT. According
to Pamela Smith, president of election integrity organisation verified voting, the voting
machines are widely leveraged in e-voting, such as in Louisiana, Georgia, New Jersey
and etc a. The advantages of electronic voting are prominent in the sense that they are
convenient and save much energy and cost in casting and tallying the votes. Moreover,
thanks to the development of science and technology, the financial costs to produce voting
machines are much lower and thus they are widely used in IoT applications.
Traditional voting systems with a central party organising the voting activities suffers
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central hub and communicated by C/S models, which is subject to several issues. Firstly,
all the voting devices in the system are identified and authenticated by the central server,
which requires a huge processing capacity. Secondly, centralised frameworks may easily
be the target of DoS (denial-of-service) attack and have single-point-of-failure issues.
Thirdly, this may cause some privacy issues. As an alternative, self-tallying schemes were
proposed, which does not need a third party to tally the ballots and reveal the final result.
Instead, after all the voters cast the ballots, anyone can collect the ballots and compute
the final results simultaneously. However, self-tallying schemes inherently suffer from
fairness issues, in the sense that a malicious voter (sensor) can collect other voters’ ballots
to compute the final result before casting his/her own ballot. That is, they can know the
final result ahead of schedule. Moreover, a voter may refuse to reveal his ballot, making
it hard to obtain the final result due to an abortive issue.
To adapt to the self-tallying voting system, the notion of decentralised IoT was pro-
posed. A decentralised paradigm of IoT is promising to solve many issues of a cen-
tralised management system. However, establishing such a framework is quite challeng-
ingb. Blockchain is an emerging technology, which is a public ledger that achieves decen-
tralization through cryptographic tools and consensus. With blockchain, communications
between machines and sensors become easy and effortless. A majority of decentralised
IoT leverages blockchain [110] to build the underlying P2P network. A San Francisco
startup Heliumc has built a blockchain-based machine network for IoTd. In this chapter,
we are aiming to build a blockchain-based self-tallying voting system to enhance security
and privacy.
4.2 Related works
Self-tallying e-voting. E-voting is a flourishing and fadeless topic in academic research.
In traditional centralised e-voting protocols, a central authority is usually involved in or-
ganising the election and counting the votes. To achieve stronger voter privacy, Kiayias
and Yung [72] proposed the notion of self-tallying voting, a new paradigm in decen-
tralised e-voting systems. In self-tallying systems, tallying is an open procedure in which
any party, including voters and observers, can validate each ballot and compute the fi-
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construction by leveraging a bulletin board, which achieves perfect ballot privacy and
dispute-freeness, but the computational cost is linear with the number of voters. Groth
et al.[62] proposed a simpler scheme with better efficiency for each voter. They also
constructed an anonymous broadcast channel with perfect message secrecy at the cost
of increased round complexity of the protocol, which needs n+ 1 rounds for n voters.
Hao et al. [64] proposed a self-tallying voting protocol based on a two-round anonymous
veto network protocol (AV-net). Their protocol provides the same security properties and
achieves better efficiency in terms of round complexity. Khader et al. [69] claimed that
[64] is neither robust nor fair, and advanced the protocol by adding a commitment phase
and a recovery round. However, the commitment phase is expensive and the recovery
phase ignores the ballots of the abortive voters in their construction.
Blockchain-based e-voting systems. There are already some existing works on blockchain-
based e-voting protocols. The role of blockchain in e-voting protocols varies from scheme
to scheme. Most of the works incorporate blockchain with bulletin boards and still em-
ploy a trusted authority for voter privacy, such as Follow My Votee and TIVIfg. Some of
the existing works are based on cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin [13, 130] and privacy-
enhancing altcoins [82]. Takabatake et al. [120] proposed a voting protocol based on
Zerocoin to enhance voter privacy. In 2017, McCorry et al. [90] presented Open Vote Net-
workhi, the first implementation of a decentralised self-tallying e-voting protocol based
on blockchain. The commitment in [90] is the hash of the vote, which is irrecoverable if
a voter refuses to cast his ballot in the voting phase. Netvote j is a decentralised voting
platform on Ethereum. The users can download the DApp to interact with the system in
order to vote.
Blockchain-based IoT solutions. Resource constraint, storage limitation and security
are the main hindrances for IoT systems. Researchers and companies have explored
the potential of blockchain in IoT systems, with the topics focusing on different as-
pects of IoT, such as device management, access control, supply chain, IoT security
review and so on [37, 65, 70, 127]. Several solutions require additional off-chain stor-
age [47, 131]. Some of the solutions integrate cloud [83] to the blockchain-based IoT,
ehttps://followmyvote.com/
fhttps://tivi.io/
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in which blockchain is the overlay of the systems but they are not fully decentralised
[47, 107]. Some solutions leverage private blockchains and eliminate the proof-of-work
[47, 48, 100]. Aiming at IoT, Bahga et al. [8] presented a blockchain platform for IoT
based on the distributed app (DApp), which could be applicable to industrial and manu-
facturing applications. Slockk, a German startup, uses smart contracts to manage the lock
of real-world property and achieves fair exchange between users directly. More potential
solutions to IoT issues of blockchain can be found in [128].
4.3 System and security model
In this section, we describe the system model of the blockchain-based self-tallying
voting system for decentralised IoT and list the necessary security requirements and the
security model of a self-tallying voting protocol.
4.3.1 System model
The framework of a blockchain-based self-tallying voting protocol for a decentralised
IoT system is shown in Figure 4.1. There are three roles in the system, namely smart
devices, a gateway and a blockchain. The IoT system is equipped with a number of smart
devices, which are regarded as voting devices. A blockchain is leveraged to achieve a P2P
overlay network and can also fulfil device management [65] and a bulletin board. Each
device needs to register when they first enrol in the system and cast ballots through the
gateway to the blockchain. After collecting the ballots from the blockchain, the results
can be obtained immediately to make decisions for the whole IoT system. Note that, the
blockchain leveraged in the model can be a private blockchain or a consortium blockchain
(according to different voting scenarios) rather than a public blockchain, which enjoys ef-
ficient consensus in practice, like practical byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) [27]. We can
also designate a block generator to generate new blocks if a private blockchain is suitable
for the application. We also note that the security of blockchain in our voting system mat-
ters a lot, which is the foundation of the security of the whole system. Blockchain also
plays an important role in the security guarantee of the voting protocol.
kSlock.it. https://slock.it.










Figure 4.1: The framework of the blockchain-based self-tallying voting system
4.3.2 System components
Suppose there are n voting devices in the system denoted as voter Vi, where i is the
counting variable from 1 to n. We denote xi a variable x for the voter Vi and {xi}i∈n the
set of all the variables for each voter Vi. A blockchain-based self-tallying voting system
in decentralised IoT consists of the following algorithms.
Setup(k,n)→ (ski, pki). This is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security param-
eter k and the number of voters n as input and outputs the private and public key pair
(ski, pki) for each voter Vi.
Commit(vi,{pk j}( j 6=i, j∈n))→ (Ci). This algorithm is run by each voter Vi. On input
a vote vi and all the other voters Vj’s public key {pk j}( j 6=i), it outputs a commitment Ci
and a corresponding zero-knowledge proof. Ci and the proof will be published on the
blockchain.
Vote(vi,ski,{pk j}( j 6=i, j∈n))→ (Vi). This algorithm is run by each voter Vi. On input a
vote vi, the private key ski, and the other voter Vj’s public key {pk j}( j 6=i, j∈n), it outputs a
ballot Vi and a zero-knowledge proof to prove the ballot is in the right form (a.k.a. follow
the protocol), and publishes Vi and the proof on the blockchain.
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Tally({Vi}(i∈n))→ (Result). This is a deterministic algorithm that takes all the ballots
{Vi}(i∈n) as input, and outputs the election result Result.
Recover({sk j}( j 6=i, j∈n),{Ci}(i∈n)) → (vi). This algorithm is to recover the abortive
voter’s vote. On input the abortive voter’s commitment Ci and all the other voters’ private
key {sk j}( j 6=i, j∈n), it outputs the abortive voter’s vote vi.
4.3.3 Attack model
We consider two types of adversaries in our system: the passive adversaries and the ac-
tive adversaries. The passive adversaries would not actively involve in the voting process,
but only eavesdrop from the communication channel and/or the blockchain, trying to get
the knowledge of the ballots. Active adversaries could actively hinder or manipulate the
voting, and can abort before the voting finishes or collude with other voters to get more
information about the ballots.
4.3.4 Security requirements
A self-tallying protocol is supposed to satisfy the following four security requirements
against the attack model defined above. The first one is to resist passive adversaries and
the other three are against active adversaries.
• Maximal ballot secrecy. A partial tally of the ballots can be accessed only by
collusion of all remaining voters.
• Self-tallying. After all the voters cast their ballots, anyone is able to compute the
voting results with all the ballots.
• Fairness. Fairness means that nobody has the priority to get a partial tally ahead
of schedule. Self-tallying protocols always suffer from fairness issues, including
abortive issues and adaptive issues. Abortive issues indicate that some of the users
refuse to reveal their votes and abort before casting their ballots, then the final
results won’t be revealed. Adaptive issues state that the last voter has the priority to
know the final results in advance, which may affect his choice or make him abort,
causing an abortive issue.
• Dispute-freeness. This property states that anyone can check whether the voters
follow the protocol or not. This is an extension of universal verifiability.
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4.3.5 Security model
In this section, we formalise the security model for maximal ballot secrecy.
Suppose there are maximal n−2 corrupted voters in the maximal ballot secrecy game,
who are fully controlled by the adversary, since n− 1 collusive voters can easily get the
information of the last voter according to the final result in the game. The adversary can
make queries to the commitments as well as the corrupted users’ ballots, and also get
the final result of the election. And later in the challenge phase, given two ballots from
different votes {0,1} for the two uncorrupted voters, the adversary needs to tell which of
the two ballots is from the vote 1. The detailed security model between a challenger C
and an adversary A is as follows.
Maximal ballot secrecy (MBS): We say a self-tallying voting scheme is MBS-secure,
if no polynomially bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against a chal-
lenger C in the following game.
Initial. There are n voters in the game. A declares two target voters Vs,Vt to be chal-
lenged upon. The other voters are regarded as corrupted users, whose votes are all con-
trolled by A . C randomly chooses Vb from {Vs,Vt} and set the vote of Vb as 1, and the
other voter’s vote as 0.
Setup. C generates the private and public key pairs for each voter. Then C forwards
all the public keys and the corrupted users’ private keys to A .
Queries. A can choose any ballots for the corrupted users and make some queries,
including the Commit queries and the Vote queries corresponding to the chosen ballots.
• Commit queries. A can query the commitment for a vote. Then C generates the
commitment and records the ballot and the commitment in the list LC .
• Vote queries. A can make queries on the votes generated by any user other than
Vs,Vt .
Challenge. C outputs two challenge ballots on behalf of the uncorrupted voters Vs and
Vt chosen in the Initial phase.
Tally. A computes the final result of the election according to the collected ballots.
Guess. A outputs a guess guess to determine which one between Vs and Vt has cast the
ballot of 1.
In the above model, the reason we set two challenge ballots rather than one is to prevent
the adversary from deducing the challenged vote from his known information. Specifi-
cally, the adversary can control the ballots of the corrupted voters and obtain the election
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result after collecting the challenge vote, if there is only a single challenge vote, the ad-
versary can have a non-negligible advantage in the guessing game. After collecting the
votes together, the adversary can do the tallying by itself to know the election result. To
see why we set the different ballots for the two challenge votes, let’s suppose the follow-
ing situation. If we set the challenge vote with the same ballot from {0,1}, and all the
corrupted voters controlled by the adversary vote the same ballot, then the adversary can
get the knowledge about the challenge vote easily after knowing the results, in which the
advantage ε is non-negligible.
Definition 4.1. The voting scheme is MBS secure if for any polynomial-time adversary,
|Pr[guess =Vb]−1/2| ≤ ε,
where ε is negligible.
4.4 Construction
In this section, we present a concrete construction of the self-tallying voting system
assisted by blockchain. As shown in Figure 4.2, the system contains three phases, Pre-
vote phase, which includes Setup and Commit algorithms, Vote phase, which includes
Vote algorithm, and After-vote phase, which includes Tally and Recover algorithms. In
Pre-vote phase, the system is initialised and the voters register to obtain their private-
public key pairs. Voters put their public keys together with the zero-knowledge proofs for
the corresponding private keys on the blockchain. Commit is to ensure fairness. If voters
skip the commit part and cast their ballots directly, the last voter has the priority to access
the final result ahead of schedule. In this phase, other voters cannot see the vote but only
the commitment of the vote. Thus, the voters need zero-knowledge proofs to prove the
committed vote is in the right form (follow the protocol). Later, if the last voter refuses
to vote, other voters can recover the ballot according to commitment and get the result.
In Vote phase, the voters cast their encrypted ballots. In After-vote phase, by collecting
all the ballots from the blockchain, the final result can be obtained publicly. Recover is
optional, which is invoked when the last voter does not follow the rules to cast his/her
ballot. The ballot of the last voter can be recovered by the corresponding commitment






















Figure 4.2: The workflow of the blockchain-based self-tallying voting system.
4.4.1 Dealing with abortive issues
Basic idea. The existing approaches to deal with the abortive issue are adding a recov-
ery phase, in which the abortive users are excluded by removing their ballots, and tallying
the ballots from the remaining voters. However, an abort may be caused by some user
who knows the unwanted result and is against revealing the result. So, simply removing
the votes might lead to a different voting result. Thus, we modify the recovery phase in
[90]. In our modification, if the last voter quits after making a commitment, then his/her
ballot can be revealed according to the corresponding commitment with the cooperation
of all the other voters. The detailed construction is as follows.
Setup(k,n)→ (xi,yi). On input a security parameter k, and the number of voters n,
it initialises the system by choosing two large prime p and q, where q is the divisor of
p− 1. Z∗p is a cyclic group modular p and Zq is the subgroup of order q. Each voter Vi
chooses a random private key xi ∈ Z∗q , and computes the public key gxi . Then Vi generates
a zero-knowledge proof as ZKPoK1{(xi) : yi = gxi}(cf. Figure 4.3). The public key and
the corresponding zero-knowledge proof are published to blockchain.
Commit(vi,{y j}( j 6=i, j∈n))→ (Ci). Before casting a ballot, each voter Vi collects the
other voters’ public key y j( j 6=i). To generate a commitment to the vote, Vi chooses a
random ρi and publishes βi = gρi . Vi makes the commitment Ci = gviYiρi to ensure fairness,
where vi is the vote from {0,1} and Yi = ∏nj=1, j 6=i y j. The voters also need to generate a
zero-knowledge proof to prove that the commitment is in the right form (cf. Figure 4.4)
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Figure 4.3: Zero-knowledge proof for Setup
as
ZKPoK2{(ρi) : (Ci = Yiρi ∨Ci = g ·Yiρi)∧βi = gρi}.
And then the commitment and zero-knowledge proof are put on the blockchain.
Vote(vi,xi,{y j}( j 6=i, j∈n))→ (Vi). To ensure the secrecy of the vote, all voters encrypt
their votes as Vi = hixigvi , where hi = ∏i−1j=1 y j/∏
n
j=i+1 y j. A zero-knowledge proof is
generated to prove that the vote vi is the same as the one committed in the commitment.
The statement (cf. Figure 4.5) is as follows.
ZKPoK3{(xi,ρi) : (Ci = Yiρi ∧Vi = hixi ∧ yi = gxi ∧βi = gρi)
∨(Ci = g ·Yiρi ∧Vi = g ·hixi ∧ yi = gxi ∧βi = gρi)}.
Then publish the ballot on the blockchain.








i=1 vi . As ∑ni=1 vi is within a small set, the result Result can be
easily obtained in a brute-force manner.
Recover({x j}( j 6=i, j∈n),{Ci}i∈n)→ (vi). If the last voter Vi does not cast his ballot in
Vote phase, then each of the remaining voters Vj(1≤ j≤ n, j 6= i) publish a recover factor
for Vi as Ri j = y jρi = βi
x j together with a zero-knowledge proof to prove that it is in the
right form (cf. Figure 4.3). The value of gvi can be computed as gvi =Ci/∏nj=1, j 6=i Ri j =
Ci/∏nj=1, j 6=i y j
ρi . Then the value of vi is easy to get as there are only two candidates.
To compute the final result of the election, each remaining voter Vj publishes ĥ j
x j ,
where ĥ j = ∏nk= j+1,k 6=i y j/∏
j−1
k=1,k 6=i y j, and a ZKPoK to prove the knowledge of x j as in
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Figure 4.3. Now everyone can compute the result of the remaining voters as g∑ j 6=i v j =
∏ j 6=i ĥ j
x jVj. So the final result of this election is ∑ j 6=i v j + vi.
Prover Verifier
vi = 1 vi = 0
w,e1,r1 ∈R Zq w,e2,r2 ∈R Zq
a1 = Yir1Cie1 a1 = Yiw
b1 = gr1βi
e1 b1 = gw
a2 = Yiw a2 = Yir2(Ci/g)
e2
b2 = gw b2 = gr2βi
e2
a1,a2,b1,b2−−−−−−−→
e←−−−−−−− e ∈R Zq
e2 = e− e1 e1 = e− e2
r2 = w−ρie2 r1 = w−ρie1
e1,e2,r1,r2−−−−−−−→








Figure 4.4: Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for Commit
We note that the proofs in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 are three-move interactive proto-
cols with the techniques in [39], which can be transformed into non-interactive protocols
following Fiat-Shamir’s heuristics [52] by setting e to be a hash value of a secure hash
function.
4.4.2 Dealing with adaptive issues
The adaptive issues seem inevitable in self-tallying protocols from its definition because
the last voter holding the ballot has the priority to access the final results ahead of the
other voters. We suggest using time-locked primitives [14, 108] to deal with the adaptive
issues in voting systems. Time-lock encryption allows users to get the results only after
a certain time [86, 89]. Once the deadline is passed, the decryption can be performed
immediately. It is stated in [86] that time-locked encryption can be achieved by using
66 CHAPTER 4. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SELF-TALLYING VOTING SYSTEM
Prover Verifier
vi = 1 vi = 0
wx,wρ ,e1,rx1 ,rρ1∈RZq wx,wρ ,e2,rx2,rρ2∈RZq
a1 = Yirρ1Cie1 a1 = Yiwρ
b1 = hirx1Vie1 b1 = hiwx
c1 = grx1 yie1 c1 = gwx
d1 = grρ1 βi
e1 d1 = gwρ
a2 = Yiwρ a2 = Yirρ2 (Ci/g)
e2
b2 = hiwx b2 = hirx1 (Vi/g)e2
c2 = gwx c2 = grx2 yie2
d2 = gwρ d2 = grρ2 βi
e2
a1,a2,a3,a4,b1,b2,b3,b4−−−−−−−−−−−−→
e←−−−−−−−−−−−− e ∈R Zp
e2 = e− e1 e1 = e− e2
rx2 = wx− xie2 rx1 = wx− xie1
rρ2 = wρ −ρie2 rρ1 = wρ −ρie1
e1,e2,rx1 ,rx2 ,rρ1 ,rρ2−−−−−−−−−−−−→
e = e1 + e2
a1 = Yirρ1Cie1
b1 = hirx1Vie1
c1 = grx1 yie1
d1 = grρ1 βi
e1
a2 = Yirρ2 (Ci/g)
e2
b2 = hirx2 (Vi/g)e2
c2 = grx2 yie2
d2 = grρ2 βi
e2
Figure 4.5: Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for Vote
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witness encryption with blockchain as the computational reference clock. We borrow this
idea in our protocol by encrypting the vote with witness encryption and the witness can
be produced by blockchain after a certain time. And the blockchain can also act as the
computational reference clock to measure the “certain” time, say after generating certain
blocks. Then the votes can be decrypted once the deadline is passed and thus all the voters
and observers can do the tallying to obtain the voting result simultaneously.
4.5 Security proofs
In this section, we show that the proposed protocol satisfies all the security require-
ments presented in Section 4.3.
Firstly, we show that the zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge in Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4
and Figure 4.5 satisfy completeness, special soundness [39, 42] and HVZK. We show the
detailed proof of Figure 4.4 as an example and omit the proofs in other figures, since the
proofs are quite similar.
Theorem 4.1. The zero-knowledge proof in Figure 4.4 satisfies completeness, special
soundness and honest verifier zero-knowledge.
Proof. We omit the proof for completeness as it’s straightforward to verify. Recall that
the witness for the statement in ZKPoK2 is ρi.
To prove special soundness, the goal is to extract a witness from the three-move in-
teraction with two accepting conversations in polynomial time. Given the two accepting
conversations with the same values in the first round, different random numbers in the







2), it can be checked easily that one of the following holds
ρ ′i = (r1− r′1)/(e1− e′1) or ρ ′i = (r2− r′2)/(e2− e′2).
To prove HVZK, assume there exists a simulator S , who is given a random e. It ran-




e2,e,e1,e2,r1,r2), which is an accepting conversation. It is indis-
tinguishable from the one generated by the honest prover.
Next, we prove the proposed scheme is MBS secure if ZKPoK is zero-knowledge and
the DDH assumption holds.
Theorem 4.2. If there exists an adversary that can win the guessing game in the MBS
security model with a non-negligible advantage, then we can build an algorithm B that
can break the zero-knowledge of the ZKPoK and the DDH problem.
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Proof. Suppose there are n voters V1, · · · ,Vn in the game. The challenger C can interact
with the adversary A . We list a sequence of games [115] to prove Theorem 4.2. We
denote Pr[Wini] as the winning probability of an adversary (output a correct guess) in
Gamei.
Game 0: This is the original Game defined in section 4.3.5. A chooses two target
voters Vs,Vt to challenge upon and forwards them to C . C tosses a coin to decide that
one of the voters from {Vs,Vt} votes 1 and the other one votes 0. The reason that we do
in this way is to let A knows nothing even from the tally result. The one who votes 1
is denoted by V ∗. The challenges are denoted as {C∗s ,π∗s ,V ∗s } and {C∗t ,π∗t ,V ∗t }, where
C∗k is the commitment of the vote, π
∗
k represents all the ZKPoK in the scheme, V
∗
k is the
ballot, k ∈ {s, t}. The adversary outputs a guess guess, then from the definition of the
MBS game, we have
Pr[Win0] = Pr[guess =V
∗
].
Game 1. Game 1 is the same as Game 0 with one difference. C runs a simulator S
as in 4.2, and replaces all the zero-knowledge proofs (π∗s ,π
∗
t ) with the simulated proofs
(π,π ′) without using the real witness. The setting is indistinguishable from A ’s view. If
A can distinguish between the two settings in Game 0 and Game 1 with a non-negligible
advantage, then we can use the adversary to construct an algorithm B to violate Zero-
Knowledge of ZKPoK. Thus, the adversary’s winning probability in Game 1 satisfies the
following equation.
|Pr[Win1]−Pr[Win0]| ≤ εZK
Game 2. Game 2 is the same as Game 1 with one difference. C replaces the commit-
ment C∗s with a random number Cs. The two settings are indistinguishable from A ’s view.
Specifically, C generates private and public key pairs for the voters other than {Vs,Vt}.
Then set the public key for Vt as ga, βs as gb, R ∈ {gab,gr}, where r is a random number.
C sets C′s = g
vsR · (gb)∑
n
i=1,i 6=s,t xi Clearly, if there is a difference in the adversary’s winning
probability between Game 1 and Game 2, we can use the adversary to construct an algo-
rithm B to violate DDH problem. Thus, the adversary’s winning probability in Game 2
satisfies the following equation.
|Pr[Win2]−Pr[Win1]| ≤ εDDH
Game 3. Game 3 is the same as Game 2 with one difference. C replaces the commit-
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ment C∗t with some random number C
′
t . Following the same analysis as in the previous
game, C sets the public key of Vs as ga, βt as gb, R ∈ {gab,gr}, where r is a random
number. C sets C′t = g
vt R · (gb)∑
n
i=1,i6=s,t xi . If there is a difference in the adversary’s win-
ning probability between Game 2 and Game 3, we can use the adversary to construct an
algorithm B that violates the DDH problem. Thus, the adversary’s winning probability
in Game 3 satisfies the following equation.
|Pr[Win3]−Pr[Win2]| ≤ εDDH
Game 4. Game 4 is the same as Game 3 with one difference. C changes the values
of V ∗s ,V
∗




t satisfying a certain relation. The change
is indistinguishable from A ’s view under the DDH assumption. Wlog, we assume s < t.
Given the DDH instance (A = ga,B = gb,C) where C ∈ {gab,gr}, C sets the public key
of Vt and Vs as A = ga and B = gb, respectively. C computes V ′s and V
′
t as
V ′s = g
















j=t+1 x j .
Thus, V ′s and V
′
t are two random elements satisfying V
′
s = gA
′B′/V ′t . Clearly, if there is
a non-negligible difference in the adversary’s winning probability between Game 3 and
Game 4, we can use the adversary to construct an algorithm B to solve DDH problem.
Thus, the adversary’s winning probability in Game 4 satisfies the following equation.
|Pr[Win4]−Pr[Win3]| ≤ εDDH
Wrapping up. The winning probability for A in Game 4 to output a correct guess
is 1/2 because in this game the challenges contain only random numbers, which are in-
dependent of the votes vs,vt . Therefore, we can conclude that there is only a negligible
difference in winning probability for an adversary between Game 0 and Game 4, if all
the ZKPoKs in the scheme are zero-knowledge and DDH assumption holds. So the prob-
ability that A wins the MBS game is 12 + ε , where ε = εZK +3εDDH .
Now, we show that the scheme satisfies fairness, self tallying and dispute freeness as
well.
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Fairness. Suppose voter Vi votes for vi in the Commit phase and refuses to provide
the vote in the Vote phase. Due to the Soundness of ZKPoK, we can guarantee that vi is
decryptable by other voters in the Recover phase.
Self-tallying. The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in each algorithm in the pro-
posed protocol forces the voters to perform honestly according to the protocol. After all
the voters cast their ballots, the self-tallying property is easy to verify. Since ∏ni=1 hi
xi = 0
in the Tally algorithm, the self-tallying property is achieved.
Dispute freeness. To dispute freeness, again, the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
in each algorithm of the proposed protocol ensures that the commitments and ballots are
generated in the right form and can be publicly verified.
4.6 Performance evaluation
In this section, we first analyse the properties, the computational complexity and com-
munication overhead of the proposed protocol, and then report the implementation results
of each algorithm. We also test the gas cost of each algorithm on a private blockchain.
4.6.1 Protocol analysis.
A comparison among the existing self-tallying protocols is provided in Table 4.1. We
focus on several main properties that a self-tallying voting protocol should have, including
privacy, fairness, robustness. The number of rounds in the protocol is also considered in
the table. From Table 4.1, we can see that our protocol satisfies all these properties. [72]
also has a good performance in this table, however, the efficiency is not good enough.
The computation complexity analysis is provided in Table 4.2. The parameters in Table
4.2 are elaborated as follows. Assume there are n voting machines and one of them aborts
in the Vote phase. We only count the expensive operations and ignore the cheap ones.
exp denotes the exponentiation operation. ZKP for exp denotes the zero-knowledge proof
to prove the knowledge of an exponent. ZKP for AND denotes the zero-knowledge proof
to prove several statements about discrete logarithms are true simultaneously. ZKP for
OR denotes the zero-knowledge proof to prove the 1-out-of-2 statement about discrete
logarithm is true. We can see from the table that our proposal is more efficient than the
first two protocols and also comparable to the third one. As in [64], if a voter refuses
to cast his ballot, the voting would abort and restart the whole protocol. Our protocol
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Table 4.1: Comparisons among the existing self-tallying e-voting
self-tallying privacy fairness robustness rounds
KY02 [72]














√ √ √ √
c
– In this table, c represents a constant number and n is the number of voters.
improves the conditions by adding the Commit and Recover, which costs some additional
computation but is acceptable.
Table 4.2: Computational complexity analysis
Protocols exp ZKP for exp ZKP for AND ZKP for OR
[72] 2n+2 n+1 n 1
[62] 4 2 1 1
[64] 2 1 0 1
Ours 2 1 4 2
The communication overhead for each algorithm is analysed in Table 4.3, in which |Zp|
and |Zq| represent the length of the element in the group Zp and Zq, respectively.
4.6.2 Implementation results
We implement our proposal to test the time consumption of each algorithm in a variety
of test environments. In our experiments, we first implement the protocols on a laptop
(Figure 4.6). For a better simulation of IoT devices, we then run the protocols on a
mobile phone (Figure 4.7), which is supposed to enjoy constrained resources. Besides,
Raspberry Pi is regarded as the super-platform to build IoT projects. Thus, we evaluate
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Table 4.3: Communication overhead Analysis
Setup Commit Vote Tally Recover
3|Zp|+ |Zq| 6|Zp|+4|Zq| 9|Zp|+7|Zq| (n−1)|Zp| (n+3)|Zp|+ |Zq|
the simulations on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ (Figure 4.8). In this subsection, we first
introduce the environmental parameters and then illustrate the performance.
Environment. The running environment of the laptop is with Win 8 64-bit operating
system and Intel Core (TM) i5-4300 @2.49 GHz CPU with an 8 GB RAM. And the con-
figuration of the phone is an Android 7.1.1 operating system with Qualcomm MSSM8998
@2.45 CPU (Octa-core) and a 6 GB RAM. The Raspberry Pi is equipped with Broadcom
BCM2837B0, 1.4 GHz 64-bit quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 CPU and 1 GB LPDDR2
SDRAM. The operating system for the Raspberry Pi is Raspbian with kernel v4.14, which
is the recommended operating system based on Debian. The projects are written in C++
language with Miracl libraryl under Visual Studio 2010 for the laptop and Android Studio
compiler for the mobile phone, respectively. The project in Raspberry Pi is with the help
of GMP librarym. We test the efficiency of each algorithm with the increasing number of
voters. The implementation results are illustrated as follows.
Implementation results. In our experiment, we set the number of voters from 3 to 12
to test the efficiency of each algorithm. As we can see from the three figures (Figure 4.6,
4.7, 4.8), the trend of algorithms is almost the same on each platform, but the magnitude
is different, which shows different processing capability of the three kinds of devices.
The time consumption of all the algorithms is linear with the number of voters, as the
more voters in the system, the more computations are required for each algorithm. In the
four algorithms, the most expensive one is Vote, as ZKPoK3 is dominant in Vote and it
is the most complicated one among all the zero-knowledge proofs, which costs 21.03 ms,
49.794 ms and 0.48 s for 12 voters on the laptop, the Android phone and the Raspberry Pi,
respectively. The most efficient algorithm is Tally, which is consistent with our theoretical
analysis, as no zero-knowledge proof is needed and the equation to tally the votes is the
product of the voters’ ballot, which is linear with the number of voters. The running time
of Tally for 12 voters is 4.076 ms, 21.714 ms, and 0.21 s on these three platforms. For
the other two algorithms, Commit and Recover, the expensive zero-knowledge proofs are
lhttps://certivox.org/display/EXT/MIRACL.
mwww.gmp.org.
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Figure 4.6: Simulation on laptop
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needed in these two algorithms, but are not as complicated as the one in Vote. The time
costs for Commit on these three platforms for 12 voters are 12.264 ms, 49.794 ms and
0.27 s, respectively. When it comes to Recover, the time consumption is 10.2 ms, 24.8 ms
and 0.243 s on the three platforms, respectively.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12





















Figure 4.7: Simulation on Android device
4.6.3 Gas cost on the blockchain
We also evaluate the algorithms with Ethereum smart contracts written in Solidity n on
a private blockchain in a test network to test the gas cost. The transactions are deployed
with Ethereum wallet o with Geth server p. The gas cost of each transaction is listed in
Table 5.4. We can see from the Table 5.4 that, for each transaction, we provide the gas
cost as well as the corresponding ether cost and US Dollar cost, in which the gas price
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Figure 4.8: Simulation on Raspberry Pi
commitments, the encrypted ballots and the corresponding zero-knowledge proofs can be
computed locally. We also provide smart contracts for the aforementioned phases that the
users can call to get the values offline. In this table, the main costs of online phases are
to verify the proofs in each algorithm, and for offline phases, the main costs are to create
proofs in the algorithms. For the online part, Register is a part of Setup, which is to put the
public key of a user on the blockchain. Commit and Vote are to put the commitment and
the ballots on the blockchain. Register, Commit and Vote all contain the verification of a
zero-knowledge proof shown in section 4.4. Register costs 317,614 gas, which also has
several expensive accessing operations to the storage. Vote costs more gas than Commit,
as the zero-knowledge proof in the former is more expensive than that in the latter. Tally
is the cheapest one, since to tally the result doesn’t need zero-knowledge proofs. Besides
that, the computation of hi and Yi costs 328,454 gas and 319,732 gas, respectively for four
voters, which equals 0.0066 ether and 0.0063 ether. There are more reverse operations in
hi than those in Yi. Therefore the cost of hi is a little bit higher than that of Yi. The USD
cost for each online phase is less than 1 dollar, which is acceptable. The offline phase,
which costs 1 dollar on average each, is optional.
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Table 4.4: Gas cost for each transaction
Online Register Commit Vote Tally
GasCost 157,970 67,761 116,958 49,058
EtherCost 0.0031 0.0013 0.0023 0.0009
USDCost 0.589 0.247 0.437 0.171
Offline ZKP Commit Vote OrProof
GasCost 317,614 357,151 222,873 2,377,266
EtherCost 0.0064 0.0071 0.0044 0.047
USDCost 1.216 1.349 0.836 0.893
4.7 Summary
Self-tallying voting systems are alternatives to unsuitable, traditional centralised voting
systems in decentralised IoT. Unfortunately, self-tallying voting systems inherently suffer
from fairness issues, such as adaptive and abortive issues caused by malicious voters.
In this chapter, we introduced a framework of the self-tallying voting system based on
blockchain to address these issues. We proposed a concrete construction and prove that
the proposed system satisfies all the security requirements, including fairness, dispute-
freeness and maximal ballot secrecy. We simulated the algorithms on a laptop, an Android
phone and a Raspberry Pi to test the time consumption and evaluate the gas cost of each
algorithm in a private blockchain as well. The implementation results demonstrate the
practicability of our system.
Chapter 5
Non-equivocation in Blockchain
“Blockchain is awesome technology. It’s a mathematical
framework that is free of politics and human error”
– Tyler Winkelvoss
In this chapter, we introduce the details to achieve non-equivocation in blockchain-
based system. Part of the content in this chapter appeared in [81].
5.1 Introduction
Equivocations in blockchain. Non-equivocation is a basic security requirement for
computing systems, especially decentralised systems. Some early research works have
indicated that it is impossible to deal with equivocation without trusted parties (trusted
hardware) [77] or strong assumptions (high replication factors) [27]. The emergence of
blockchain promises a breakthrough to address the issue based on a much weaker and
more realistic assumption. Unfortunately, blockchain itself is a decentralised system, and
hence, detecting and dealing with equivocation in the blockchain is also challenging. Re-
cently, there have been several proposals that aim to identify equivocation effectively in
the blockchain. Blockstack [2] uses a simple Kademlia-based Distributed Hash Table
(DHT) as a discovery layer to ascertain the equivocation. Such bitcoin witnessing ap-
proaches reduce the difficulty of equivocation to the hard problem of forking a chain. Still,
they are inefficient as a user is required to download a large number of transactions to find
out an equivocation. To efficiently verify the bitcoin witnesses, Tomescu et al. [122] pro-
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posed Catena, a tamper-evident log built on the bitcoin blockchain. The new statement in
their design is included via the OP-RETURN scripts. Aspegren [4] modified Catena and
proposed a scalable non-equivocation based on b verify for verifiable data management.
Other solutions to blockchain-based non-equivocation contracts are based on the deposit
mechanism with the help of the built-in time-lock script of bitcoin [3, 12, 75]. It is also
suggested that using Turing-complete smart contracts can also achieve non-equivocation
contracts. Ruffing et al. [109] proposed a new primitive named accountable assertions
to deal with the equivocation in distributed protocols such as bitcoin [97], in which two
conflict statements within one context are sufficient to extract a secret publicly. The ex-
isting solutions for handling equivocation mainly focused on specific issues (e.g., double
spending/authentication), which significantly limits their application domains. Designing
a contractual solution that can be instantiated to handle more general, e.g. user-defined
policy-based equivocation is of both theoretical and practical interest. However, this re-
mains an elusive research problem.
5.2 Related works
One of the main contributions of this section is PoAPS, the idea of which is inspired
by a similar notion named double-authentication-preventing signatures (DAPS). DAPS
was proposed by Poettering and Stebila [103, 104], in which the data to be signed is split
into a subject and a message. If a signer signed two conflict messages for the same sub-
ject, the signing key of the signer would be revealed. Poettering et al. [103] presented
a generic construction by involving the extractable two-to-one trapdoor function, which
can be achieved by the group of quadratic residues modulo a Blum integer. Subsequently,
Bellare et al. [9] proposed two highly efficient DAPS constructions based on identifi-
cation trapdoor schemes. Subsequently, Derler et al. [44] generalised this notion into
N-times-authentication-preventing signatures based on secret sharing schemes, where N
signatures issued by the same signer within a subject are required to extract the signing
key. Poettering et al. [102] put forward a shorter DAPS, which not only beats the sig-
nature size in [44], but also reduces the key size from linear to constant based on the
identification scheme different from that of Fiat and Shamir [52]. Derler et al. modified
the protocol in [44] and proposed a generic DAPS construction with constant keys and
signatures size based on symmetric-key primitives [43]. Boneh et al. [17] proposed the
notion of lattice-based DAPS and presented the first post-quantum DAPS system based
on broadcast encryption [51]. Furthermore, they generalised the primitive by proposing
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predicate-authentication-preventing signatures without showing a concrete construction.
The original source of the concept of DAPS actually dates back to leakage-deterring sig-
natures from [71], which de-incentivises the sharing of a signing key in whatever form,
by embedding a secret to it. In this section, we inherit this basic idea and design solutions
to more generalised cases.
We should note that the new primitive we propose in this section, namely PoAPS,
is a generalisation of the previous approaches. The extraction policy in our proposal
is a tree-based multi-level structure. Thus the schemes mentioned above can be re-
garded as special cases of our proposal. To be more specific, the schemes with double-
authentication/double-spending extractability correspond to a simple 2-ary structure in
our scheme, and the N-times-authentication-preventing signatures are equivalent to our
solution for a single-level tree with N leaf nodes.
5.3 Building blocks
In this section, we review a few building blocks used in our construction to achieve
policy-based non-equivocation in blockchain.
5.3.1 Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) algorithm [68] is widely used due to
its short length of the generated signature. ECDSA is also the default signature algorithm
to sign transactions in bitcoin [97] system.
• EKeyGen(1λ ). Let G be an elliptic curve group, with a prime order p. g is the
generator of G. Choose x∈ Z∗p and compute y= gx. Return the key pair as (sk, pk)=
(x,y).
• ESign(sk,m). On receiving a message m, execute the following steps to generate a
signature.
- choose a random k ∈ Z∗p and compute R = gk, where R = (Rx,Ry).
- define r = Rx mod p. If r = 0, go back to step 1.
- let s = k−1(H(m)+ rx)mod p. If s = 0, go to step 1.
- return σ = (r,s).
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• EVerify(pk,m,σ). On receiving (m,σ), check if r = 0 or s = 0, return ⊥. Other-
wise, run the following steps.
- compute z = H(m).
- let u1 = zs−1 and u2 = rs−1
- compute R̃ = (R̃x, R̃y) = gu1yu2 .
- if R̃x = r mod p, return 1. Otherwise, return ⊥.
The ECDSA satisfies EUF-CMA if elliptic curve DL assumption [68] holds.
5.3.2 Verifiable secret sharing
Secret sharing schemes, as put forth by Shamir [114], are a secure mechanism to store
sensitive information among multiple users. The concrete construction provided in [114]
is based on Lagrange interpolation to enable polynomial reconstruction. Specifically, a
(t,n) secret sharing scheme includes n players P1, · · · ,Pn and a dealer. The dealer gen-
erates n secret shares and distributes them to each player a unique share. Any subsets
of the players containing t or more players can reconstruct the secret s, while less than
t pieces of secret shares gather no information about the secret. Verifiable secret shar-
ing schemes [36] were proposed to resist a malicious dealer from distributing an invalid
share, which allows the participates to verify the received secret shares without knowing
the secret. A typical (t,n) verifiable secret sharing consists of the following phases: secret
share distribution, verification of the shares and secret reconstruction.
• SShareGen (s) → (si,auxi): On input a secret s, the dealer generates n shares and
distributes the shares si to each player together with an auxiliary information auxi
for verification.
• SVerify(si,auxi)→ (0/1). On input a secret share and the auxiliary information, this
algorithm outputs 1 to indicate this is a valid share, and otherwise, outputs 0.
• SReconstruct({(xi,si)}ti=1) → (s): If a set of players S ⊂ P, where |S| ≥ t, are
collecting their shares si together as input, this algorithm outputs the original secret
s.
A verifiable secret sharing is supposed to satisfy secrecy and verifiability [53][101][58].
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Definition 5.1 (Verifiability). If a share si generated by a dealer with a secret s can pass
the SVerify algorithm with the help of the auxiliary information auxi, this share must be
valid. Specifically, if such t shares are collected, the secret s can be recovered.
Definition 5.2 (Secrecy). The secret shares reveal no information about the secret s. Less
than t shares disclose no information about the secret s.
5.4 Policy-authentication-preventing signatures (PoAPS)
In this section, we present technical descriptions of the proposed PoAPS. Firstly, we
introduce policy-based verifiable secret sharing (PBVSS) as a building block to design
PoAPS. Then we formalise PoAPS by introducing the system components and security
model. Finally, we provide a generic construction together with an instantiation.
5.4.1 Policy-based verifiable secret sharing (PBVSS)
Before diving into the details of PoAPS, we first introduce PBVSS as a main building
block, which is a generalisation of the verifiable secret sharing schemes to that with a
policy-based extract structure. Specifically, a PBVSS allows a secret to be shared among
several users, in which each share can be verified publicly and individually without the
help of other shares. Only the shares satisfying a specific extract structure can recover the
secret.
5.4.1.1 Concrete construction of PBVSS
We show a concrete construction based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [114] and the
tree-based access structure [61]. Define the extract policy based on a tree structure, which
is built in a top-down manner. Each non-leaf node is a threshold gate containing a unique
polynomial, whose degree is the threshold value minus one. The secret is embedded in
the root node, as the constant term of the polynomial in the root. Each child node contains
the shares of the secret in the parent node. The leaf nodes store the final secret shares.
We first introduce some notations in the construction. G is a multiplicative cyclic group
of a large prime order p and g is the generator of G. For a node N, prt(N) is the parent of
the node N. num(N) denotes the number of children of a node N. index(N) is the specific
number with the node N. kN is the threshold number of node N. dN is the degree of the
polynomial embedded in this node N. We now present the detailed constructions.
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• PSSPolicyGen(s,desc) → (Γ, pp). On input the description of a policy, the dealer
generates a tree-based structure. And then formalise the tree with the help of the se-
cret s to get the extract policy Γ. To be more specific, insert the detailed parameters
of the tree in a top-down manner as follows. Choose a random polynomial qR(z) for
the root R by setting qR(0) = s. The degree of qR(z) is dR = kR−1. The other coeffi-
cients of qR(z) are some randomness chosen by the dealer. Then for non-leaf nodes,
generate the embedded polynomials level by level recursively. Specifically, choose
a random polynomial qN(z) for each non-leaf node N, whose degree is dN = kN−1,
by setting qN(0) = qprt(N)(index(N)) and the other coefficients with random num-
bers a(N)i (1 ≤ i ≤ dN). And then compute ga
(N)
i , where {a(N)i }(1 ≤ i ≤ dN) are the






and gs as the public
parameters pp in the system and outputs the policy Γ.
• PSSShareGen(s,Γ)→ (si,auxi). On input the secret s and the policy Γ, the dealer
computes the shares, which are only contained in the leaf nodes of a policy Γ. For
each leaf node N, the dealer selects a random xi ∈ Zp, and computes the value of
the polynomial embedded in the parent node, that is, s′i = qprt(N)(xi). The share
si is returned as (xi,s′i). The auxiliary information auxi is the subset of the public
parameters related to the polynomials of the nodes on the path from the current leaf
node to the root (Detailed instantiation is shown in sec. 5.4.6).
• PSSVerify(si,auxi,Γ)→ (0/1). The verifier holding the secret share in node C and
the corresponding auxiliary information (si,auxi) validates the share as follows.
First parse xi and s′i from si and check g
s′i with the help of the auxiliary information.














j (1≤ j ≤ dprt(C)) are in auxi and ga
(prt(C))
0 can be expressed by calling
the polynomials in the upper-level nodes till gs in root R.
• PSSReconstruct({(xi,si)}i⊆S,Γ)→ (s): If a set of players S ⊆ P, where S satisfies
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denotes the Lagrange coefficient.
5.4.1.2 Security analysis of PBVSS
In this part, we briefly analyse the security of the proposed PBVSS. To be more specific,
we show the proposed PBVSS satisfies secrecy and verifiability.
Secrecy. Our construction of PBVSS is based on Shamir’s secret share scheme [114],
which satisfies perfect secrecy. We generalise the basic construction into a multi-level
tree-structured construction, in which the secret is shared level by level from the root node
to the leaf nodes. The root node contains the secret to be shared. For each intermediate
node in each level as a threshold gate, the constant of the embedded polynomial is a secret
share of its parent node and will be distributed to multiple secret shares in the next level.
For each node, the mechanism is degenerated to the basic secret share scheme, in which
the shares reveal nothing about the secret in the upper level, including the original secret
in the root and thus the secrecy of the secret in the upper level is naturally achieved. The
shares in the leaf nodes are recursively generated and the secrecy of the proposed PBVSS
is satisfied.
Verifiability. Verifiability can be easily checked by the correctness of PSSVerify. Specif-
ically, equation 5.4.1.1 can be validated with the public parameters {ga
(N)
i } and the poly-
nomials embedded in the nodes from the specific leaf to the root by the substitution of
qN(0) = qprt(N)(index(N)).
5.4.2 System components of PoAPS
A PoAPS is a signature scheme with an extraction algorithm that can extract the secret
key when the pre-defined policy is broken. The formal system components containing
four algorithms are as follows.
A policy-authentication-preventing-signature (PoAPS) on a message space M and a
policy S consists of the following PPT algorithms.
• PKeyGen(1λ )→ (pk,sk). On input a security parameter λ , this algorithm outputs a
secret-public key pair (sk, pk) for a signer.
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• PPolicyGen(sk,desc)→ (Γ, pp). On input the user’s secret key and the description
of a policy, this algorithm outputs an extract policy Γ, to express the policy to reveal
the signer’s secret key, and public parameters pp for public verifiability. The leaf
node of Γ is embedded with some subject to express the corresponding rules.
• PSign(sk,m,Γ)→ (σ ). On input a secret key sk, a message m ∈M and the policy
Γ, this algorithm outputs a signature σ . Note that in the original DAPS [103], m is
composed of a subject (sub j) and a payload (msg). In this model, we follow this
setting and the sub j of a message is bound with Γ.
• PVerify(pk,m,σ ,Γ) → (1/0). On input the public key pk, the message m ∈M , a
signature σ and the policy Γ, this algorithm outputs a bit 0/1 to indicate the signa-
ture is valid or not.
• PExtract(pk,{mi},{σi},Γ)→ (sk). On input a public key pk and a set of message
{mi} ∈M , the corresponding signature set {σi} and the policy Γ, this algorithm
outputs the secret key sk of the signer, if the messages satisfy the policy S .
Definition 5.3 (Correctness). A PoAPS is correct if for all λ ∈ N, for all (sk, pk)←
PKeyGen(1λ ), for all (Γ, pp)← PPolicyGen(sk,desp), for all messages m ∈ {0,1}∗ and
for all signatures σ ← PSign(sk,m,Γ), we have PVerify(pk,m,σ ,Γ) = 1 with an over-
whelming probability.
5.4.3 Security model
We now introduce the security properties, in which we mainly consider the most critical
properties named unforgeability and extractability. We describe the ability of an attacker
and the detailed security model between an adversary and a challenger.
Compromising set. Before presenting the other security properties, we first introduce
the notion of a compromising set of messages. A compromising set is a set containing
message-signature pairs that break the pre-defined policy. The formal definition of a
compromising set is as follows.
Definition 5.4 (Compromising set). Let Γ be an extract policy defined on k messages.
We say a set of k message-signature pairs {(mi,σi)}i∈[k] are Γ-compromising for some
specific pk and Γ, if each signature σi is valid on mi and the k messages-signature pairs
satisfy the extract policy Γ.
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Unforgeability. Unforgeability prohibits an adversary (not a signer, but can be any ob-
servers) from generating some valid signatures to pass the verification. In this case, the
signer is honest and the observers are the attackers. The observers are intended to forge
some signatures to complete a compromising set and extract the secret. The unforge-
ability of PoAPS is much similar to that of the standard signature with one difference.
Specifically, A specifies policy description desc, and the challenger C generates the key
pairs and details the policy according to desc. It also maintains a signing list. The ad-
versary A is allowed to make some queries for the signatures. The difference is, for a
fixed secret key sk and policy Γ, A can make queries to only non-compromising sets of
messages. If the current queried message together with the previous queried messages
satisfies Γ, C aborts. The concrete definition of existential unforgeability for PoAPS is
shown as follows.
ExpEUFPoAPS,A (λ ):
(sk, pk)← PKeyGen(1λ ).
(Γ, pp)← PPolicyGen(sk,desc).
Q← /0, P ← /0.
(m∗,σ∗)←A OPSign(sk,·)(pk).
where OPSign is on input m = (sub j,msg) by A :
if Γ(P ∪ sub j) = 1, return ⊥
else
σ ← PSign(sk,m,Γ),
Q←Q∪ (m,σ), P ←P ∪ sub j
return σ
return 1, if the following conditions hold.
PVerify(pk,m∗,σ∗,Γ) = 1,(m∗,σ∗) /∈Q
return 0.
Figure 5.1: EUF security for PoAPS
Definition 5.5 (Unforgeability). A PoAPS is existentially unforgeable if for all PPT ad-
versaries A , we have
AdvEUFPoAPS,A = Pr[Exp
EUF
Σ,A (λ ) = 1]≤ negl(λ ),
where ExpEUF
Σ,A (λ ) is defined in Figure 5.1.
Extractability. Extractability states that as long as enough valid message-signature pairs
satisfying a policy are collected, the secret is able to be recovered. In this case, the
signer is the attacker that is going to break the pre-defined policy but avoid being traced.
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Specifically, the signer is intended to generate signatures and the shares that can pass the
verification while even if the policy is satisfied, the secret key still cannot be recovered.
In the following formal security definition, two cases are considered. In the trusted setup,
A signs the message and publishes the policy with a secret key sk generated by C . A
succeeds if enough message-signature pairs are collected, but extract a secret key sk′
different from the secret key sk used in signing messages. In the untrusted setup, the
signer can manipulate valid signatures that pass the verification with pk. A succeeds if
enough message-signature pairs are collected, but extract a secret key sk′ which is not
corresponding to the public key. The concrete definition of extractability for PoAPS is
shown as follows.
Definition 5.6 (Extractability). A PoAPS is extractable (PSE) (resp. PSE∗ with untrusted
setup), if for all PPT adversary A , we have,
AdvPSEPoAPS,A = Pr[Exp
PSE








is defined in Figure 5.2 (resp. Figure 5.3).
ExpPSEPoAPS,A (λ ):
(sk, pk)← PKeyGen(1λ ).
(Γ, pp)← PPolicyGen(sk,desc).
(σ1, · · · ,σk)←A (sk, pk,Γ).
sk′← Extract(pk,(σ1, · · · ,σk),Γ).










(pk,Γ,σ1, · · · ,σk)←A (1λ ,desc).
sk′← Extract(pk,(σ1, · · · ,σk),Γ).




sk′ is not the secret key
corresponding to pk
return 0.
Figure 5.3: PSE* security for PoAPS
5.4.4 Generic constructions of PoAPS
In this section, we show that a PoAPS can be obtained in a generic way by using a
secure digital signature scheme with a PBVSS scheme. The basic idea is as follows.
The policy is described in the tree-based extract structure, whose leaf nodes are bound
with some subjects and non-leaf nodes are threshold gates. The signer first inserts the
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parameters to detail the policy with the secret key. When signing a message, the message-
signature pair (mi,σi) with a secret share of the secret key will be bound to the leaf node.
If sufficient shares are collected, which means the extracting condition is met, the secret
key can be revealed via the extract algorithm.
To be more specific, let DSig = (DKeyGen, DSign, DVerify) be a EUF-CMA digital
signature and PBVSS = (PSSPolicyGen, PSSShareGen, PSSVerify, PSSReconstruct) be
a secure PBVSS scheme. The detailed construction of PoAPS = (PKeyGen, PPolicyGen,
PSign, PVerify, PExtract) is shown in Figure 5.4.
PKeyGen(1λ )→ (pk,sk). Call DKeyGen(1λ ) to setup the system and return the public
and secret key pair (pk,sk).
PPolicyGen(sk,desc) → (Γ, pp). On input the application-based policy description
desc, call PSSPolicyGen(sk,desc) to generate the structure Γ and public parameters
pp.
PSign(sk,m,Γ) → (σ ). To sign a message m = (sub j,msg), firstly check which
subject in the leaf node of tree, m is related to. Then, to generate a secret share
in the corresponding leaf node, the signer calls PSSShareGen(sk,Γ) with sub j as
the random inputa, and returns the share s and the corresponding aux. Then with
m′= sub j‖msg‖s‖aux, call DSign(sk,m′) to return σ ′. The final signature is σ =
σ ′‖sub j‖msg‖s‖aux.
PVerify(pk,m,σ ,Γ) → (0/1). The verifier first parses m′=sub j‖msg‖s‖aux from σ
and calls DVerify(pk,m′,σ ′) to check the validity of the signature. If the signature is
invalid, return 0 and aborts. Otherwise, parse s and aux in the signature and check
the validity of the shares s by calling PSSVerify(s,aux,Γ). If both callings return 1
simultaneously, this algorithm outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0 and aborts.
PExtract(pk,{(mi,σi,Γ)}) → (s). If the message-signature pairs satisfy the policy,
then with the shares embedded in the signatures, call PSSReconstruct({(xi,s′i)}i⊆S,Γ)
to recover the signing key sk.
Figure 5.4: Generic construction of PoAPS
Remark: We note that, in the current construction, a signer can insert more than one
signature for one leaf node in Γ, if DSign(sk,m′) is a standard secure signature scheme. If
some applications require only one signature in one leaf node, the double-authentication-
preventing signature scheme [103] can be applied.
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5.4.5 Security analysis of PoAPS
Theorem 5.1. If there is an adversary A who can break the unforgeability of our pro-
posed PoAPS scheme, then the challenger C can construct another algorithm S ′ to break
the unforgeability of the underlying digital signature or the secrecy of the PBVSS with an
overwhelming probability.
Proof. We show our proof in the selective-policy model, where the challenged policy is
defined in advance. W.l.o.g, A selects a specific Γ to challenge upon, which is a tree-
based structure with the subject embedded in the leaf nodes. We describe our proof in a
sequence of games shown as follows.
Game 0. Game 0 is the same as the original game defined in section 5.4.3.
Game 1. Game 1 is the same as Game 0 with one difference. C maintains a singed list Q
for ever issued queries by A . If A submits a (m,σ ) pair that (1) is not in Q and (2) can
pass the verify algorithm, C declares failure and aborts.
Analysis. C randomly chooses a public key y and forwards it to A . A specifies some
policy description descΓ and issues the subjects {sub j} it is going to query. C details Γ
by assigning polynomials to each node and simulates the public parameters besides y.
Define satisfied node as Sat(N) and unsatisfied node as UnSat(N), where Sat(N) is the
node that the subtree TN with root N is satisfied with the queried subjects and UnSat(N) is
the node where the subtree is not met. For Sat(N), define PolySat(TN ,sub j,λN) to set up
the polynomials in the satisfied node N, which takes the sub-tree TN , the queried subject
set, and an integer λN as input. Denote the degree of the polynomial as dN . Specifically,
from the root R, for the first Sat(N), set qN(0) = λN and choose the other dN randomness
as the coefficients to fix the polynomial qN . And then set polynomials for each child node
N′ of N recursively as PolySat(TN′,sub j,qN(index(N′))) until the leaf nodes. Publish the
public parameters in Sat(N) as ga
(N)
i , where a(N)i are the coefficients in the polynomials
of satisfied node N. For the leaf nodes i in Sat(N), the shares are qprt(i) (H(sub j)). And
the auxiliary information is set accordingly with the randomly chosen coefficients. For
UnSat(N), the parameters should be simulated using randomness, the public key and the




to set up polynomials in un-
satisfied node N, which takes the sub-tree TN , the queried subject set sub j and an element
gλN as input. For an unsatisfied node N, there are at most dN satisfied children nodes N′.
Let hN be the number of satisfied children nodes of N. For the satisfied child node N′
of N, choose a random λN′ and set qN(index(N′)) = λN′ . Choose dR−hR randomness to
aThe subject sub j is uniquely mapped to an integer, e.g., by using a collision resistance hash function
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fix qN . The root node must be an unsatisfied node. Thus, C firstly define the polynomial
in node R. qR(0) is implicitly set as x, where y = gx. For the satisfied child node N,
call PolySat(TN ,sub j,λN) to determine the other coefficients. Otherwise, call PolyUn-
Sat(TN ,sub j,gλN) to implicitly fix the polynomial until the parent nodes of the leaf nodes.
Thus for these nodes, ga
(N)
i , where a(N)i are the coefficients for the node N, can be pub-
lished as part of the public parameters. Now we simulate the polynomial for the parent
node of the leaf nodes in the UnSat(N). For such parent node P of a leaf node, gqP(0) is
implicitly fixed with its index and the polynomial in its parent node. To simulate other co-
efficients, choose random secret shares for the queried subject set as {(sub ji,si)}(1≤i≤hP),
where hP is the number of the queried leaf node under node P. Choose dP−hP random-
ness to determine the polynomial in node P, where dP is the degree of the polynomial
in node P. Thus, with these dP secret share {(sub ji,si)} and gqP(0), with the equation
5.4.1.1, the public parameters in node P can be simulated. The simulation of Γ is perfect
with the secrecy of the underlying PBVSS. Thus, the above setting is identical from A ’s
view.
C maintains a secret share list P , which records the subject in {sub j} and the corre-
sponding secret shares. After the simulation, C completes the secret share list P with
the settings above. Now, A adaptively issues a query with message m = (sub jm,msgm)
on its will, but is restricted to the subjects in {sub j}. C first responds with the secret
share and then simulates the signature on m. To simulate the secret share, C checks the
corresponding subject sub jm the message m is related to. If sub jm /∈ {sub j}, C aborts.
Otherwise, C looks up the list P and finds the corresponding record sm as the secret
share. And return the subset of the public parameters on the path from the leaf node to
the root as the auxiliary information auxm.To simulate the signature, C checks whether m
is in the signed list Q. If m is in Q, C responds with the corresponding signature. Oth-
erwise, C checks whether m together with the other messages in Q satisfy the policy Γ.
If so, C aborts. Otherwise, C answers signing queries by calling the challenger C ′ in the
underlying signature scheme with msgm‖sub jm‖sm‖auxm and y as the input and returns
the signature σ ′ to A . Then C updates (m,σ ′) in Q.
The setting in Game 1 is identical to that in Game 0 from A ’s view. If A causes C
to abort with non-negligible probability, then we can use A to construct a sub-algorithm
S ′ that can break the unforgeability of the underlying digital signature scheme.
Theorem 5.2. If there is an adversary A who breaks the extractability of our proposed
PoAPS under PSE* model, then we can construct another algorithm B to break the cor-
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rectness of the underlying digital signature or the verifiability of the policy-based verifi-
able secret sharing scheme.
Proof (Sketch). We show a heuristic analysis of extractability in the following two steps.
Firstly, if a message-signature pair (m,σ ) in PoAPS can pass the verify algorithm, then a
valid secret share can be parsed from σ . Secondly, perfect verifiability guarantees that the
secret key can be extracted from the secret sharing scheme if sufficient shares are collected
in a recursive way. Thirdly, according to the PBVSS in 5.4.1, pk is bound with the root R
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Figure 5.5: Policy instance in the instantiation
5.4.6 Instantiation of PoAPS
We show an instantiation with the extract structure in Figure 5.5 together with ECDSA
signature and our proposed PoAPS, which is perfectly compatible to blockchain sys-
tem. ECDSA = (EKeyGen, ESign, EVerify) denote the ECDSA signature and PBVSS =
(PSSPolicyGen, PSSShareGen, PSSVerify, PSSReconstruct) be a secure PBVSS scheme.
We show an instantiation with the policy specified in Figure 5.5. This is a three-level tree-
based structure with the root node R. W.l.o.g, we define the root node R and node A as
AND gates, and B as a 3-out-of-4 gate. The details of the instantiation of PoAPS are as
follows.
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• PKeyGen(1λ )→(x,y). Call EKeyGen(1λ ) to set up the system with some security
parameter λ and return a key pair (x,y).
• PPolicyGen(x,desc)→(Γ, pp). On input the application-based policy description as
the tree shown in Figure 5.5, generate the extract policy Γ and the public parameters
pp by calling PSSPolicyGen(x,desc). Specifically, the polynomial for R is fR(z) =
a(R)1 z+ x, where a
(R)
1 is a random number and x is the secret key. The polynomial




0 , where a
(A)
1 is a random number and a
(A)
0 is fR(indexA).
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• PSign(x,m,Γ)→(σ ). To sign a message m=(sub j,msg), first check the message
is binding to some subject in the leave node N. Then generate a secret share for
the leaf node by calling PSSShareGen(x,Γ) with the random input as H(sub j) and
return the share s and the corresponding aux. To generate a signature, m is set as
m′ = sub j‖msg‖s‖aux and calls ESign(x,m′) to return σ ′ = (r,s). Then the signa-
ture is σ = σ ′‖sub j‖msg‖s‖aux.
• PVerify(y,m,σ ,Γ)→(0/1). The verifier first parses m′ = sub j‖msg‖s‖aux from σ
and calls EVerify(y,m′,σ ′) to check the validity of the signature and then parses the
embedded s and aux to validate the shares s by calling PSSVerify(s,aux,Γ). If the
two callings return 1 simultaneously, it outputs 1; otherwise, output 0.
• PExtract (y,{(mi,σi)},Γ)→(s). If the message-signature pairs satisfy the policy,
then with the shares embedded in the signature, call the PSSReconstruct({(xi,si)}i⊆S,Γ)
to recover the signing key x.
5.4.7 Extension to the construction with a designated beneficiary
The protocol in the previous sections is with public verifiability and public extractabil-
ity for the secret. However, some scenarios require public verifiability with private ex-
tractability by a designated beneficiary. Thus, in this section, we introduce PoAPS with
public verifiability and private extractability by a designated beneficiary integrating to the
blockchain.
For the system model of the PoAPS with a designated beneficiary, besides the system
roles in PoASS, another beneficiary is also involved. To be more specific, the signature
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can be verified by anyone in the system, but only a designated beneficiary can recover
the secret when the structure is satisfied. To achieve the new security requirement, some
new techniques are required, including public-key encryption schemes [49] and zero-
knowledge proofs [59, 105]. The basic idea of the PoAPS with public verifiability and
private extractability is as follows. The signer and the beneficiary hold public-secret key
pairs (pks,sks) and (pkb,skb), respectively. Upon receiving a message m, the signer binds
m by some subject in the structure Γ. And then the signer generates a secret share s
according to the Γ and encrypts the share with an encryption scheme with the beneficiary’s
public key pkb and gets e = Encpkb(s‖aux). And then generate a zero-knowledge proof to
prove that e is a correct form of encryption under pkb and the corresponding plaintext is a
valid secret share that can be verified with pks. After that, the signer sets m = m‖sub j‖e
and signs the message m to obtain a signature. Upon receiving the signature, all the users
can check the validity of the signature and the embedded encrypted shares while gets
nothing about the share. Only the beneficiary can decrypt e with the corresponding secret
key skb. After collecting all the shares, the beneficiary can extract the secret key.
To be more specific, we show the detailed construction on top of the proposed PoAPS
with the help of ElGamal encryption [49] and zero-knowledge proofs [59, 105] as follows.
• PKeyGen(1λ ) → (x,y). The signer calls EKeyGen(1λ ) to set up the system with
some security parameter λ and return a key pair (xs,ys). The beneficiary calls
EKeyGen(1λ ) to generate a key pair (xb,yb).
• PPolicyGen(xs)→ (Γ). Call PSSPolicyGen(xs) to generate a application-based ex-
tract structure.
• PSign(xs,m) → (σ ). To sign a message m, the signer needs to do the following
steps.
(1) First check the message is binding to some attributes in the leaf node N.
(2) Then generate a secret share for the leaf node by calling PSSShareGen(xs,Γ)
and return the share s and the corresponding aux.
(3) To encrypt the share, the signer first chooses a random number α , and calculates
E = (A,B) = (hα ,s−1 · yαb ).
(4) To generate a zero-knowledge proof for the encryption, the signer needs to prove
SPK{(α) : V B = gy
α
}.
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The instantiation of such proof can be easily obtained following the techniques in
[101].
(5) To generate a signature, m is set as m = m‖attr‖s‖aux‖E‖π , where π is the
proof, and calls ESign(xs,m) to return a signature σ = (r,s).
• PVerify(y,m,σ ) → (0/1). The verifier first calls EVerify(y,m,σ) to check the va-
lidity of the signature and then parses the embedded mi,si and auxi to check the
validity of the shares si by calling PSSVerify(si,auxi). Verify the embedded zero-
knowledge proof. If the all the verification return 1 simultaneously, it outputs 1;
otherwise, output 0.
• PExtract (ys,xb,{(mi,σi)})→ (xs). If the message-signature pairs satisfy the pol-
icy, then decrypt the shares embedded in the signature σi as si = Axb/B, call the
PSSReconstruct ({(xi,si)}i⊆S) to recover the signing key xs.
Remarks. We show three remarks for the proposed scheme above.
(1) A blockchain-based non-equivocation with public verifiability and private extractabil-
ity can be designed by integrating the deposit mechanism borrowed from [125] together
with the above PoAPS by the designated beneficiary.
(2) The proofs of forgeability and private extractability can be obtained directly from
the underlying PoAPS (c.f. section 5.4.5).
(3) Additionally, this protocol also needs to satisfy another security requirement, pri-
vacy, which shows the ciphertexts do not reveal the information about the encrypted
shares. This property indicates that even if collecting enough transactions (satisfying
the extract structure) containing encrypted shares, the outsiders are not able to recover
the corresponding secret key. In the model, this can be reduced to the security of the
underlying encryption scheme.
5.5 Policy-based non-equivocation in blockchain
Putting everything together, in this section, we introduce policy-based non-equivocation
in the blockchain. Before diving into the technical details, we give an overview of the
proposed policy-based non-equivocation in blockchain. For a quick understanding of our
motivation, we show a typical target application example, and then present the system
model and workflow.
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5.5.1 Application example
Suppose a state library provides a self-governed e-book borrowing trial system bc. A
qualified user is allowed to borrow several books for free following the rules specified in
Figure 5.1. The rules stipulate the categories and the limited number of e-books allowed
for various types of borrower types. To register to the system, each citizen needs to prove
himself/herself to the administrator and acquire a pseudonym, with which the user also
needs to make a deposit. Academic community members must show an evidence that they
have valid University staff cards. Upon successful registration, a qualified user can use
a self-governed borrowing service to borrow and read the available e-books. To borrow
an e-book, he/she will generate a corresponding record related to the information of the
e-book and his/her pseudonym. The borrowing lists are available publicly to allow public
transparency and making the system more appealing. If a user complies with the rule, then
the user can enjoy the free service. However, if a user breaks the rule, say borrowing more
books than stated or borrows books from non-qualified categories, this leads to a conflict
of interest according to the specified policy. In case such an equivocation happens, the
user will lose his/her deposit as a penalty of this ‘misbehaviour’. Further applications and
explanation are provided in Sec. 5.7.
Table 5.1: Rules of the application example
Borrower type categories limitation
Teenagers children’s books 5 items
under 18 R-level books 0 items
others 2 items
Academic Specialised books 3 items
community members others 2 items
other citizens all types 2 items
5.5.2 Design approach
The main ideas of our protocol are introduced as follows.
Pre-defined policy description. It is obvious that a general policy is more complicated
than double-spending, which only involves two transactions. We intend to leverage the
bhttp://www.americanlibrarydirectory.com/Register.asp?REGISTER=1
chttps://www.adelaide.edu.au/library/news/list/2019/07/18/self-service-library-trial-at-waite
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tree-based structure as that in the attribute-based cryptography. The root node R contains
secret information of the user, and the shares of the secret are embedded in the leaf nodes.
If a user follows the rules, sufficient shares cannot be collected to recover the secret.
Otherwise, the secret can be recovered with enough shares. The policy structure in the
previous example can be shown in Figure 5.6. In the first level, it indicates the citizen
to the corresponding group with OR gate. In the second level, the gates describe the
categories. The leaf nodes contain the information of the specific books they borrowed
and the secret shares. Our proposed PoAPS ensures the extractability of the secret.
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Figure 5.6: The example policy in state library trial system
Blockchain as the public log system. We leverage blockchain as the public log system to
achieve the self-governed system. ckchain contains continuous-growing blockchains
and the records are immutable and publicly verifiable. The observers in the system with
incentive by the deposit of the user to make penalty “automatic”.
De-incentive mechanism. The deposit mechanism is used to de-incentive users in the
system. Take the application in section 5.5.1 as an example, when citizens first enrol in
the system for the first time, they are assigned a public-secret key pair. They need to
make some deposit with his/her secret key. The secret key of the deposit account will be
revealed if the user breaks the pre-defined policy.
5.5.3 System description
The system model is shown in Figure 5.7. Three entities are involved in the system,
namely an authority, a signer and a blockchain. The authority generates a general extract
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policy, which will be used to reveal the signer’s secret key if several transactions signed
by the same signer satisfies the policy (equivocation condition). The extract policy is a
tree-based structure, in which the leaf nodes will be inserted by some transactions with a
specific message and signature pairs and the non-leaf nodes are the threshold gates. The
signer first makes some deposit with the secret key and then has the ability to sign trans-
actions with the signature algorithms. The transactions are logged into the blockchain
for public verification. Anyone who finds the equivocation in the system can reveal the
corresponding secret key based on the extract policy and gets the deposit as a reward. The
blockchain is a public log to record the transactions, which can resist the 51% attack.
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Figure 5.7: System model of policy-based non-equivocation in blockchain
We show the way to achieve non-equivocation in the blockchain by integrating the
proposed PoAPS. There are three phases in the system, namely Setup, Sign and Extract.
The workflow is as follows.
• Setup. This phase involves the authority and the users. The authority is not a fully
trusted party, who can be offline after initiation. The authority initiates the whole
system and specifies the policy with some policy description desc that the users
in the system need to follow. Each participant who involves in the system calls
5.6. IMPLEMENTATION 97
PKeyGen(1λ ) to return a key pair (pkU ,skU ). The user who conducts transactions in
the system details the extract structure according to the pre-defined policy by calling
PPolicyGen(skU ,desc) and return Γ and pp. Γ is stored in blockchain publicly. The
user who engages in the system creates deposit v in time T on the blockchain.
• Sign. In this phase, we suppose user A as a signer, who will be penalised in
case of equivocation, and user B as a verifier, who can detect the misbehaviour
of A by validating the transactions. A generates a transaction with necessary in-
formation and signs the transaction by calling PSign(skA, tx,Γ), where tx contains
the transaction details. The transaction will be validated by the miners by calling
PVerify(pkA, tx,σ ,Γ). If the transaction is invalid, it will be discarded. Otherwise,
the transaction will be published on the blockchain with the consensus protocol,
which is publicly accountable by all the users in the system. B collects the transac-
tions from the blockahin and the embedded shares for future extractability.
• Extract. In this phase, if B detects equivocation according to Γ, B calls PEx-
tract(pk,{mi},{txi},Γ) to recover A’s secret key in the deposit and transfers the
money to B’s account. The users in the system compete to extract the secret and
only the first one who works it out will get the reward. If A honestly performs in
the system, A can redeem the deposit after time T without any loss.
5.6 Implementation
We evaluate the proposal in this section. First, we theoretically analyse the computation
complexity and the communication overhead of the proposed PoAPS. Then we test the
time costs of these algorithms. The gas costs of the functions are also provided together
with the actual monetary costs.
Complexity Analysis. We analyse the computation complexity and the communication
overhead of the proposed PoAPS based on ECDSA and PBVSS. We focus only on the
expensive operations, including the exponentiation and multiplication in the group and
ignore the cheap ones. The results are listed in Table 5.2.
The parameters in Table 5.2 are explained here. n is the number of the nodes in the
extract structure (tree). h is the height of the extract structure (tree). d is the degree in
a tested polynomial. expG and expP are the exponentiation operations in group G and
Zp, respectively. multG and multP are the multiplication operations in group G and Zp,
respectively.
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Algorithm Computation complexity Communication overhead
Keygen expG O(n)|G|
PolicyGen O(n)multp O(n)|Zp|
Sign expG +(d +2)multp 3|Zp|+O(h)|G|
Verify 2multp +2expG +multG +O(h)expp 1
Extract O(n)(multp + expp) |Zp|
Table 5.2: The theoretical analysis of each algorithm in PoAPS
Implementation Results. We also implement the algorithms to evaluate the time con-
sumption. The projects are written in C++ language with Miracl Library [113] to achieve
the cryptographic operations and the Barreto-Naehrig curve [45] was chosen in the evalu-
ation. The evaluation of the algorithms was first conducted on a laptop with Intel (R) Core
(TM) i7-8550 CPU @1.8 GHz Win 10 operating system. Then we test the algorithms in
a Raspberry Pi to simulate a thin client. The Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ is equipped with
64-bit quad-core ARM v7 processor rev 4 and 1 GB LPDDR2 SDRAM. The operating
system is Ubuntu Mate 16.04.6 LTS. We implement the extract structure in Figure 5.6 and
the time costs for each algorithm are shown in the table below.
PoAPS Designated beneficiary
Algorithm Laptop Raspberry Pi Laptop Raspberry Pi
execution time execution time execution time execution time
Keygen 1 ms 9.113 ms 1 ms 9.3 ms
PolicyGen 0.002 ms 0.075 ms 0.001 ms 0.083 ms
Sign 2 ms 12 ms 18 ms 92 ms
Verify 18 ms 79.26 ms 30 ms 160 ms
Extract 28 ms 98 ms 34 ms 124 ms
Table 5.3: The time costs of each algorithms in PoAPS
As we can see from Table 5.3, the execution on Raspberry Pi is much slower than that
on a laptop, as the processing capability of a Raspberry Pi is lower than that of a laptop.
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Among the algorithms, the PolicyGen is the cheapest, as the cost to initialise an access
structure is for generating some polynomials with random coefficients without other time-
consuming operations. The most expensive algorithm is Extract, as this algorithm needs
to traverse all the nodes from the leaves to the root level by level. Nevertheless, we need
to note that the sub-tree on the same level can be processed in parallel, which would
save much time. In comparison, the sub-tree at different levels can only be extracted
serially. For example, in our example, the extraction in subtree A and B can be conducted
meanwhile, which can save 6 ms. In this way, the time cost of Extract based on a multi-
level tree structure can be approximately estimated. We provide a benchmark of the time
cost of Extract algorithm on a single-level structure, which is shown in Figure 5.8. We
can tell from this figure that the time cost in a single-level structure is linear with the
number of nodes, which also complies with the theoretical analysis, as the more nodes in
the level, the more exponent operations are needed. And the algorithm is practical in the
sense that for 30 nodes, it costs 173 ms.

















Figure 5.8: Time costs of Extract algorithm on laptop in single level
We then test the efficiency of the construction with a designated beneficiary. As we
can see from Table 5.3, the time costs for KeyGen and PolicyGen are almost the same
as those in the publicly verifiable one. Sign, Verify and Extract are more costly since
more operations are needed to achieve privacy, which is in accordance with the empirical
analysis. The additional overhead in Sign is to encrypt the share and generate the zero-
knowledge proofs, as the proof is to prove witness for double discrete logarithms. And
the overhead for Verify and Extract are to verify a zero-knowledge proof and decrypt the
ciphertext, respectively. The additional overhead is 16 ms, 12 ms and 6 ms, which is
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acceptable.
For the implementation in blockchain, we use Solidity [41] to test the gas costs of
the algorithms based on the ECC library by A. Olofsson to achieve the cryptographic
computation and evaluate the corresponding actual USD costs. The gas price is 0.02
Ether per million gas and the Ether price is $1778.12 (Feb. 2021) d, which is acceptable.
Algorithm Gas costs USD costs
Verify a signature 2199 gas 0.078 USD
Verify a share 1415 gas 0.05 USD
Table 5.4: The gas costs in Ethereum
5.7 Other application examples
In this section, we show more examples in which our system provides tracing/extract
ability by the equivocation condition.
Accountable delegation of signing ability. In normal signing delegation, the original
signer issues an authorisation to the proxy signer, then the proxy signer can sign on behalf
of the original signer when the original signer is away. It is reasonable that the original
signer makes some constraints to limit the proxy signer’s signing ability. Thus, if the
proxy signer violates the rules, it can be traced by revealing the proxy signing key and the
proxy thus can not sign any more. Specifically, the original signer issues an authorisation
together with a tracing policy to the proxy signer. The proxy signer makes deposit with
his/her secret key. The proxy signer also needs to initiate the tracing policy with the
secret key and make it publicly verifiable (i.e. put it on the blockchain). Then the proxy
signer can sign (i.e generate transactions) for the original signer. The proxy signer will
be punished by losing all the deposit if he/she does not follow the policy specified by the
original signer.
Disincentivizing policy-based spending. Policy-based spending is a generalisation of
double-spending in e-cash and cryptocurrencies. Double-spending is a basic rule which
requires a single digital currency cannot be spent more than once. Policy-based spending,
with a policy linking to the currency, is more general, which can be widely used for some
dhttps://coinmarketcap.com/
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organisations. The spending policy is critical for an organisation to guide the tradeoff e.
For example, the money raised for the charity should be regulated by some rule. If the
charitable spending breaks the rule, then the secret key of the money can be revealed and
the money will be confiscated by the government.
Internet censorship. Internet censorship is to control the resources published or ac-
cessed on the Internet by the regulators or the administrators of the web site. Suppose an
online content sharing web site, in which each user has a public-secret key pair when they
registered, is allowed their users to upload and share their data. The subscribers can pay
for the material to share the data or donate to the publisher if they like the material the
publisher shares. The reward will be put in the account controlled by the secret key. Each
time the publisher uploads content, a signature should be generated for future regulation.
The web site management team defines the uploading conditions based on some tracing
structure. If any user breaks the rules, the secret key will be revealed, and the account will
be placed on the blacklist. The money in their account can be transferred to the user who
finds the violation first as a reward.
Policy-based insurance pension scheme. This example is for the condition with pub-
lic verifiability and a designated beneficiary. Suppose a private pension scheme is de-
signed by an insurance company. The scheme is a contributory one based on a policy
structure where there are many conditions, for example, the age of the participation, the
health condition, a fixed amount of the salaries received, etc. When each condition is
met, the insurance company generates a signature for the participants. If the pre-defined
policy is met, then the participant can retrieve the account and acquire the corresponding
pension inside.
5.8 Summary
Equivocation is one of the most fundamental problems that need to be solved when de-
signing distributed protocols. In this chapter, we proposed a blockchain-based solution to
address contractual equivocation, which supports user-defined fine-grained policy-based
equivocation. The core of our solution is PoAPS, which, combined with a deposit mech-
anism, allows a signer to make conflict statements corresponding to a policy to be pe-
nalised. We presented a generic construction of PoAPS based on Policy-Based Verifiable
Secret Sharing (PBVSS) and demonstrated its practicality via a concrete implementation
ehttps://russellinvestments.com/-/media/files/ca/en/insights/institutions/ understanding-effects-of-
spending-policies.pdf?la=en
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in the blockchain. Compared with the existing solutions that only handle specific equivo-
cation types, our proposed approach is more generic and can be instantiated to deal with
various kinds of equivocation.
Chapter 6
Subvector Commitments and Stateless
Blockchain
In this chapter, we introduce the details to design mercurial subvector commitments
and the applications to stateless blockchain and ZKS. Part of the content in this chapter is
in paper [78].
6.1 Introduction
Stateless blockchain dramatically reduces the overhead of transaction verification. Vec-
tor commitments (VC) are crucial tools in stateless blockchain. In this section, we intro-
duce vector commitment and its variants. We illustrate the research gap by analysing the
necessary properties in the existing constructions.
VC allows a user to commit to a set of ordered messages, which can be opened at a spe-
cific position. Normally, a vector commitment is updatable, position binding and concise.
Specifically, a VC is updatable, which enables a committer to efficiently update the com-
mitted message at some positions after the committing phase. Position binding is a basic
requirement generalised from the binding property of normal commitments [92], mean-
ing one cannot find two different and valid messages in a position in a vector commitment
in polynomial time. The concise property requires the size of the commitment and the
opening proof are independent of the number of the committed message. Thanks to the
above desirable properties, vector commitments contribute to many applications such as
accumulators, cloud storage and so forth [15, 31, 34]. Subsequently, a series of follow-up
works have been proposed, such as polynomial commitments [67] and functional com-
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mitments [84]. One of the most noticeable work is mercurial commitments (MC), which
is a special kind of VC. An MC has two ways to commit, namely hard commitment and
soft commitment. Hard commitments are the same as normal VC, while soft commit-
ments do not have the binding property to the committed messages. A committer needs
to choose a preferred way of commitment at the beginning of a commitment phase. There
are two options in the opening phase as well, namely the hard opening and soft open-
ing. Hard opening is only for hard commitments and can generate a proof to open the
committed message at a specific position. Meanwhile, soft opening is for both hard com-
mitments and soft commitments. Soft opening for hard commitment at a position cannot
be different from the committed value, whereas soft opening for soft commitment enables
the committer to open to a message in a position at his/her choice. Besides, a mercurial
commitment is mercurial hiding, meaning that hard commitments are indistinguishable
from soft ones. The special property of MC is promising to enable membership and non-
membership proofs in a set without revealing any information of the set, including its
cardinality, i.e. zero-knowledge set (ZKS).
Subvector commitments (SVC) are another important extension of VC, which were ini-
tially presented for supporting stateless cryptocurrencies in blockchain [35]. SVC allows
a user to open a vector commitment at a set of positions at the same time. Compared
to VC, SVC has a stronger requirement that the opening proof to a subset of position is
independent of not only the size of the committed messages, but also the size of the cho-
sen subset. With the wide applications in blockchain, many research works on SVC have
been proposed [50, 60, 121].
6.2 Related works
The concept of VC was proposed by Catalano and Fiore [29]. In that seminal work,
they also presented two concrete constructions based on CDH and RSA assumptions, re-
spectively. A similar notion to VC is polynomial commitment (PC), proposed in [67],
which enables a user to commit to a polynomial so that a verifier can later be convinced to
a claimed evaluation at a point. The size of a polynomial commitment is independent of
the degree of the polynomial, so is the opening proof at a point. Besides, it supports batch
verification due to the basic polynomial quotient theory, in which the size of the opening
proof for multiple evaluations is the same as that for a single point. Libert et al. [84]
generalised the concept to a functional commitment (FC) that can open to a function of
the committed messages. Specifically, the commitment can be opened to ( f ,y) such that
6.2. RELATED WORKS 105
y = f (m), where m is the committed messages. They provided a construction on linear
function f based on a composite order groups, where y = ∑ni=1 ximi. Chepurnoy et al. [35]
presented a new algebraic vector commitment scheme based on multilinear polynomial
and applied the new construction to EDRAX, a stateless verification for account-based
cryptocurrencies[5], where the miners do not necessarily store the current state, but val-
idate the transactions by accessing the latest block to check the balance in the relevant
accounts.
MC, proposed by Chase et al. [31], is a special kind of vector commitment supporting
hard and soft commitments as outlined above. Catalano et al. [28] presented a more effi-
cient construction on trapdoor mercurial commitments (TMC) based on one-way function
with weaker assumption. In their construction, the size of soft opening is much shorter,
while the size of hard opening is still linear with the number of messages. Libert and
Yung [85] proposed the concept of mercurial vector commitment (MVC) and devised a
construction based on broadcast encryption [16] with compact proofs for both hard open-
ing and soft opening.
The primitive of SVC was proposed by Lai and Malavolta [76]. They presented two
concrete constructions [76] under variants of the root assumption and the CDH assump-
tion based on [29]. The construction supports batch proof generation, meaning that it can
generate proofs for multiple positions at one-time. However, the proofs can not be aggre-
gated after generation. Boneh et al. [15] proposed an accumulator with batch verification,
which can be used to design a VC with aggregatable proofs for both membership and non-
membership. The primitive of aggregatable subvector commitment (aSVC) was proposed
[121] to enable aggregation of multiple opening proofs into a single SVC proof and hence
reduce the verification overhead. Campanelli et al. [25] proposed an incrementally aSVC
(iaSVC), which can aggregate the opening for an unbounded number of times to further
improve the efficiency. It also ensures fast generation of the opening by leveraging pre-
processing. Gorbunov et al. [60] proposed Pointproofs (PP), which can aggregate proofs
generated by multiple commitments by any entity non-interactively. Agrawal et al. [1]
proposed a new VC named key-value commitment (KVC), whose committed messages
are key-value maps. The setting can generally link to the blockchain-based cryptocur-
rency, where the key is the account address and the value is the account balance.
We summarise all the existing works on VC and its variants mentioned above based
on the properties they provide. The result is shown in Table 6.1. We can see from the
table that none of the works mentioned above provides all the promising features. In this
section, we fill this gap by presenting a vector commitment enjoying the nice features
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Scheme Updatable Aggregatable Mercurial Hiding
VC [29] X × × ×
PC [67] × × × X
FC [84] × × × X
EDRAX [35] X × × ×
MC [31] × × X X
TMC [28] × × X X
MVC [85] × × X X
SVC [76] X × × ×
SVC [15] X X × X
aSVC [121] X X × ×
iaSVC [25] X X × ×
PP [60] X X × X
KVC [1] X X × ×
Our scheme " " " "
Table 6.1: Summary of the existing vector commitments
including efficient update, aggregation, mercurial properties and privacy.
6.3 System model and security model
A mercurial subvector commitment comprises the following algorithms.
Setup(λ ,N) → (param). This is a probabilistic algorithm run by a trusted party. On
input a security parameter λ and the length of the messages N, it generates the public
parameter param.
HCommit(m, param)→ (C,aux). This is a probabilistic algorithm run by the commit-
ter. On input a group of messages m and the public parameter param, it generates a hard
commitment C and some auxiliary information aux.
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HProve(i,m[−i],aux)→ (πi). This is a deterministic algorithm run by the committer.
On input the position i, message m[−i] a and the auxiliary information aux, it outputs a
proof πi to prove that mi is committed in the hard commitment.
HVerify(C, i,mi,πi)→ (0/1). This is a deterministic algorithm run by the verifiers. On
input the commitment C, the position i and message mi and proof πi, it outputs 0 or 1 to
indicate whether πi is a valid proof.
HUpdate(C,S,m[S],m′[S],aux) → (C′,aux′). This is a deterministic algorithm run by
the committer. On input the commitment C, the set of positions S, the original messages
m[S], the updated messages m[S′] and the auxiliary information aux, it outputs the new
hard commitment C′ and corresponding auxiliary information aux′.
SCommit(param)→ (C,aux). This is a probabilistic algorithm run by the committer.
On input the public parameter param, it generates a soft commitment C, which is not
bound to any specific messages, and auxiliary information aux.
SProve(i,mi,F,aux)→ (πi). On input the position i and message mi, it outputs a proof
πi to mi at position i in the commitment. F ∈ {H,S} states the auxiliary information aux
corresponds to a hard commitment or a soft commitment. If F = H and mi is not the
originally committed value, the algorithm aborts and outputs ⊥.
SVerify(C, i,mi,πi) → (0/1). This is a deterministic algorithm run by verifiers. On
input the commitment C, the position i, the message mi and proof πi, it outputs 0 or 1 to
indicate whether πi is a valid proof.
Aggregate(F,C,S,m[S],{πi : i∈ S})→ (Π̂). This is a probabilistic algorithm run by the
committer. On input a flag F to indicate whether this is an aggregation for soft commit-
ment or hard commitment, the commitment C, the position set S, the messages m[S] and
the proofs {πi, i ∈ S}, it outputs a proof Π̂ as an aggregated proof.
AggreVerify(F,C,S,m[S],Π̂)→ (0/1). This is a deterministic algorithm run by verifier.
On input the flag F to indicate this is the verification for soft aggregation or hard aggrega-
tion, the commitment C, the position set S, the messages m[S] and the proof Π̂, it outputs
0 or 1 to indicate whether Π̂ is a valid aggregated proof.
Correctness. The correctness of an MSVC applies in several cases. Specifically, for
all λ ,N, an ordered group of messages m and a set S ∈ [N], (param)← Setup(λ ,N), the
following conditions must hold with an overwhelming probability.
• For a hard commitment (C,aux)← HCommit(m, param), a hard opening (πi[H])←
HProve (i,m[−i],aux) and a soft opening for hard commitment (πi[S])← SProve(mi, i,H,aux),
aThis is the message group without the i-th message.
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we have
HVerify(C, i,mi,πi[H]) = 1, SVerify(C, i,mi,πi[S]) = 1.
• For a soft commitment (C,aux)← HCommit(param), a soft opening for soft com-
mitment (πi)← SProve(mi, i,S,aux), we have
SVerify(C, i,mi,πi) = 1.
• For an aggregate proof (Π̂)← Aggregate(F,C,S,m[S],{πi : i ∈ S}), we have
AggreVerify(F,C,S,m[S],Π̂) = 1,
where C = HCommit(m, param), if F=H and C = SCommit(param), if F= S.
• For an updated messages m′, such that m[N \S] = m′[N \S], we have
HUpdate(C,S,m[S],m′[S]) = HCommit(m′, param),
where C = HCommit(m, param).
An MSVC needs to satisfy Mercurial binding and Mercurial hiding, which are defined as
follows.
Mercurial Binding [85]: Compared to normal biding commitments, the mercurial
binding applies for both hard commitments and soft commitments to the messages for
some positions. For hard commitments, no adversary can generate an MSVC C such that
it can be opened into two different messages in a specific position. For soft commitments,
no adversary can generate an MSVC C such that it can be opened to a single value but
partially decommitted (teased) to another value.
Specifically, given the system parameters param, it is computationally infeasible to out-
put a commitment C and the pairs (m0[S0],π0) and (m1[S1],π1) that satisfy the following
equations, where S0 and S1 denote the subsets of [1,N].
AggrVerify(H,C,S0,m0[S0],Π0) = 1,AggrVerify(H,C,S1,m1[S1],Π1) = 1,
AggrVerify(H,C,S0,m0[S0],Π0) = 1,AggrVerify(S,C,S1,m1[S1],Π1) = 1,
m0[S0∩S1] 6= m1[S0∩S1]
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If the size of the set is one, it implies the following equation holds with negligible proba-
bility.
HVerify(C, i,mi,πi) = 1,HVerify(C, i,m′i,π
′
i ) = 1,mi 6= m′i
HVerify(C, i,mi,πi) = 1,SVerify(C, i,m′i,π
′
i ) = 1,mi 6= m′i
Mercurial Hiding [28]: We now define the mercurial hiding, which has the following
requirements. (1) No PPT adversary can learn whether C is a soft commitment or hard
commitment. (2) For hard commitments, no PPT adversary can learn the committed
values m; (3) For a soft commitment, it cannot be teased to any value before partially
de-committed.
We define the simulation-based statistical security to depict the mercurial hiding prop-
erty above, in which there exists a simulator executing the algorithms Setup*(λ ,N), Com-
mit*(param, tk), HProve*(i,m,aux) and SProve*(i,mi,aux) defined as follows.
• Setup*(λ ,N) → (param, tk). On input a security parameter λ and the size of a
group N, it outputs the system parameter param and a trapdoor key tk.
• Commit*(param, tk)→ (C,aux). This is a randomised algorithm that takes as input
the system parameter param and a trapdoor tk. It outputs a fake commitment C and
auxiliary information aux. However, C doesn’t bind to any group of messages.
• HProve*(i,m,aux)→ (πi). This is the equivocal hard opening (hard equivocation)
algorithm. Given (C,aux) generated by Commit*(param, tk), it outputs a fake proof
of hard decommitment πi on position i for C.
• SProve*(i,mi,aux) → (πi). This is the equivocal soft opening (soft equivocation)
algorithm. Given (C,aux) generated by Commit*(param, tk), it outputs a fake proof
of soft decommitment πi on position i for C.
The basic idea of the simulation-based game is that the commitments and the proofs
generated by the real protocol and the simulator are statistically indistinguishable, even
given the commitments, in which the committed messages are chosen by the adversary.
From the algorithms listed above, we can tell that there is no message in a fake commit-
ment and the proofs only involve the message to be committed, thus the fake commitment
and the fake proofs do not leak any information of the other committed values. The formal
process of the security game is defined as follows.
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Equivocation Game. The simulator C executes Setup*(λ ,N) to get the security param-
eters param and a trapdoor tk. In the game, A interacts with C to distinguish whether it
is the real-world setting or the ideal one. To be more specific, the setting of the game is
determined by C by flipping a coin b ∈ {0,1}. If b = 0, the game is with the real commit-
ment and opening proof. Otherwise, it is with a fake commitment. A is allowed to make
queries to C . At the end of the game, A needs to guess the bit b. The detailed setting is
shown as follows.
• HHEquivocation. A chooses a message tuple (m1, · · · ,mN). C flips a coin b. If
b = 0, C computes (C,aux)← HCommit(m, param) and if b = 1, (C,aux)← Com-
mit*(param, tk). Then A is provided C by the challenger C . A is allowed to make
queries on his choices of S ∈ [N]. If b = 0, C returns πi ← HProve(i,m[−i],aux).
Otherwise if b = 1, C replies with πi← HProve*(i,m,aux).
• HSEquivocation. A chooses a message tuple (m1, · · · ,mN). C flips a coin b. If
b = 0, C computes (C,aux)← HCommit(m, param) and if b = 1, (C,aux)← Com-
mit*(param, tk). Then A is provided C by the challenger C . A is allowed to make
queries on his choices of S ∈ [N]. If b = 0, C returns πi ← SProve(i,mi,H,aux).
Otherwise if b = 1, C replies with πi← SProve*(i,mi,aux).
• SSEquivocation. C flips a coin b. If b = 0, C computes (C,aux) ← SCom-
mit(param) and if b = 1, (C,aux) ← Commit*(param, tk). Then A is provided
C by the challenger C . A is allowed to make queries on his choices of S ∈ [N]. If
b = 0, C returns πi ← SProve(i,mi,S,aux). Otherwise if b = 1, C replies with πi
← SProve*(i,mi,aux).
6.4 Proposed MSVC
In this section, we put forward the detailed construction of an MSVC. Then we show
the correctness of the proposal. In the construction, we borrow the idea from both mer-
curial commitments [85] and subvector commitments [60] to achieve all the desirable
properties, which advances the performance of traditional applications in each field. For
mercurial property, we follow the techniques in [85] to lose the binding in the verification.
The involvement of C is the key point achieving soft commitment and opening. Privacy
is fulfilled via the commitment forms similar to Pedersen commitments. For the aggre-
gation, we include the idea in [60] to add a new factor for each individual proof. The
detailed construction is shown as follows.
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Setup(λ ,N)→ (param). On input a security parameter λ , it generates G=(p,G1,G2,GT ,e),
where G1,G2,GT are cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p. g1 and g2 are the
generators in the corresponding groups. H is a cryptographic hash function mapping
from {0,1}∗ to Zp. e : G1×G2 → GT denotes a type II bilinear pairing (c.f. section
2.1.2). Select a random α ← Z∗p and compute a = (α1, · · · ,αN), where αi = α i. Com-
pute ga1 = {gα1 , · · · ,gα
N
1 }, ga2 = {gα
1
2 , · · · ,gα
N




1 , · · · ,gα
2N
1 }. The




1 ). α is discarded after
initialising the system.
HCommit(m, param)→ ((C,V ),aux). On input a set of messages m, it generates the
commitment pair as follows.




gm jα j1 , C = g
θ
1 ,
where γ and θ are randomness and m j is the message of the j-th position in m. The
commitment is (C,V ) and the auxiliary information is (m1, · · · ,mN ,γ,θ).
HProve(i,m[−i],aux) → (πi). On input the messages and the auxiliary information,









Finally, the proof is generated as πi = (Wi,θ).
HVerify((C,V ), i,mi,πi) → (0/1). On input the commitment, the messages, check







= e(C,Wi) · e(g1,g2)α
N+1mi (6.1)
If it holds, it outputs 1 to indicate it is a valid proof. Otherwise it outputs 0.
HUpdate(C,V ,S,m[S],m′[S],aux)→ ((C′,V ′),aux′). On input the commitment, parse
the messages m[S] and m′[S], and compute the following equation to update the messages
in position set S in the commitment.







The updated commitment is (C′,V ′) and the updated auxiliary information is (m′,γ,θ ),
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where m[S] is replaced by m′[S] in position set S.
SCommit(param)→ (C,aux). On input the security parameter param, it chooses ran-
dom θ and γ , and generates the commitment pair as follows.
V = (gα1 )
γ , C = (gα1 )
θ
Output (C,V ) as the soft commitment pair and the auxiliary information is aux = (θ ,γ).
SProve(i,mi,F,aux)→ (πi). If F=H, parse the auxiliary information as aux=(m1, · · · ,mN).




















Finally, the proof is generated as πi =Wi. The auxiliary information is based on the flag
bit.
SVerify((C,V ), i,mi,πi)→ (0/1). On input the message, the commitment and the proof,
check if the equation (6.1) in HVerify ((C,V ), i,mi,πi) holds. If it satisfies, it outputs 1.
Otherwise, output 0.
Aggregate(F,(C,V ),S,m[S],{πi : i ∈ S})→ (Π̂). On input the flag bit as H or S, aggre-




where ti = H(i,(C,V ),S,m[S]), Wi is either a proof for hard opening or soft opening based
on F. The aggregated proof is π̂ = (θ ,Ŵ ).
AggrVerify(F,(C,V ),S,m[S],Π̂)→ (0/1). To validate an aggregated proof with flag H

















Output 1 to indicate this is a valid proof. Otherwise, output 0.
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6.4.1 Correctness.
We show the correctness of the proposal from the following aspects.











































































Thus the correctness of hard opening holds.
Correctness of soft opening. In soft opening, given V = gγ1,C = (g
α
1 )









































Thus the correctness of soft opening holds.
Correctness of aggregation. The aggregation works for both hard opening and soft








for both hard opening and soft opening. For each position i in a set S, the above equation
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Thus the correctness of soft opening holds.
Correctness of update. For update of a commitment for some position set S, given












































Thus the correctness of the update holds.
6.4.2 Mercurial binding
Our construction satisfies mercurial binding in the AFM and ROM model if l-DHE
assumption holds.
Theorem 6.1. If there is an adversary A who breaks the mercurial binding of the pro-
posed scheme, then we can construct another algorithm B to solve l-wBDHE problem
with overwhelming probability.
Proof. The proof is conducted with a game between a challenger C and an algebraic
adversary A .
Setup. C sets up the system by generating G=(p,G1,G2,GT ,e). On input the instance
ga1 = {gα
1
1 , · · · ,gα
N
1 }, ga2 = {gα
1
2 , · · · ,gα
N




1 , · · · ,gα
2N
1 } as the system
parameters param, C forwards the system parameters param to A . Since A is algebraic,
it can output z and γ such that
V = gγ1g
z>a
1 ,C = g
θ
1 .
Hash query. A is allowed to make qH hash queries on its choices. C maintains a hash
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table with entry H(i,C,V,S,m[S]), and chooses ti uniformly at random as the response.
Repeated queries will get the same response. We note that for z[S] 6= m[S], we have
Pr [z[S] 6≡p m[S] and z[S]t ≡p m[S]t ] = 1/p.
We call this an H-lucky query. If this happens, the proofs aborts. The probability for A
to make an H-lucky query is at most qH/p.
Output. A outputs
(C,V ),{Sb,mb[Sb],Ŵ b}b=0,1,
where V = gγ1g
z>a
1 and C = g
θ
1 .
Now we show how to work out gαN+11 Since m
0[S0 ∩ S1] 6= m1[S0 ∩ S1], then we have
either m0[S0] 6= z[S0] or m1[S1] 6= z[S1]. Define (S∗,m∗,Ŵ ∗) such that






2 ) = e(C,Ŵ
∗) · e(g1,g2)α
N+1m∗[S∗]>t .









= e(C,Ŵ ) · e(g1,g2)α
N+1z[S∗]>t .
With these two equations, we have
e(C,Ŵ ∗) · e(g1,g2)α







Recall that z[S∗] 6= m∗[S∗] and that there is no H-lucky queries, thus, z[S∗]−m∗[S∗])>t 6≡p








With g1 = ψ(g2) and the above equation, we can easily work out gα
N+1
1 .
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6.4.3 Mercurial hiding
It is shown in [28] that mercurial hiding is implied in the equivocation games. Thus
in this subsection, we prove the security of our proposal under HH Equivocation, HS
Equivocation and SS Equivocation.
Theorem 6.2. Our construction satisfies HH Equivocation, HS Equivocation and SS
Equivocation.





as in the real setup algorithm. α is set as the trapdoor tk.
C flips a coin b ∈ {0,1}. If b = 1, C calls Commit*(param, tk) to generate a fake
commitment as (C,V ) = (gθ1 ,g
γ
1). To answer a query for the decommitment proof on
position i, C runs HProve*(i,m,aux) and gets the corresponding hard equivocation on
























for some randomly chosen γ̃ . Then to answer the query by A , C generates the corre-












It is easy to find that the fake commitment and hard equivocations have the same distribu-
tion as the hard commitments and the hard openings for any random param, i,m.
The HSEquivocation follows the same arguments as above.
For SSEquivocation, if b = 1, C calls Commit*(param, tk) to generate a fake commit-












some random θ ′ and γ ′. It is easy to tell the soft commitment and the fake commitment
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With the theorem shown above and the claim in [28] (section 2.3), our construction
satisfies mercurial hiding.
6.4.4 Performance analysis
In this subsection, we present the theoretical analysis of the algorithms. The detailed
result is shown in Table 6.2. n is the number of the maximum messages in the commit-
ments and l is the size of the subset S. We only count the expensive group operations and
ignore the cheap ones such as hash and the operation in Zp. mult is the multiplication and
exp is short for the exponentiation. The footnote of the operations represents those in the
corresponding groups. The cost of generating a hard commitment is linear with the size
of the messages. However, this is a one-time phase. After generating the commitment,
one can update the messages with HUpdate, which is only linear with the number of the
updated positions. In all the verification algorithm, e(g1,g2)α
N+1
is known in the param,
thus this part does not require any pairing operations. For the storage size, we can observe
that the commitments are only two elements and the proofs for whichever kind of opening
are only one element in the corresponding groups.
Algorithm HCommit HProve HVerify
Time (n+2)exp1+n mult1 (n+1)exp2+(n-1)mult2 2 pair+1 multT +1 expT
size 2 |G1| 1 |G2| -
Algorithm SCommit SProve (F) SVerify
Time 2 exp1 3 exp2+1 mult2 2 pair+1 multT +1 expT
size 2 |G1| 1 |G2| -
Algorithm HUpdate Aggregate AggrVerify
Time l exp1+ l mult1 (l−1) mult1
2 pair+1 multT +
1 expT +1 exp2
size 2 |G1| 1 |G2| -
Table 6.2: Theoretical analysis of the proposal
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6.5 Applications of mercurial subvector commitments
In this section, we show potential applications of the proposed mercurial subvector com-
mitments.
6.5.1 Zero-knowledge elementary database with batch verification
Zero-knowledge sets, proposed by Micali et al. [93], enable an entity to commit to a set
S confidentially and later prove whether a random element x is in the set or not without
leaking any information of the set. Zero-knowledge elementary database (ZK-EDB) is
a follow-up work where data are stored in the form of key-value pairs. If the queried
key x is in the database, the value v corresponding to x is responded, where v = D(x). It
is shown that the commitments with mercurial properties can be leveraged to build ZKS
and ZK-EDB [31, 85]. In this section, following the framework in [31, 85], we show the
proposed MSVC can be used to construct ZK-EDB, so as ZKS.
In the committing phase, an N-ray commitment tree is built, where the leaf nodes are the
values in the queried set with the keys as the indices and the root contains the commitment
for the set. Firstly, the subtree is pruned if the keys in all the leaves are not in the database,
in order to reduce the size and enhance the efficiency. After that, only the subtrees with
at least one leaf node in the database is kept. To build the tree, for a leaf node, if the
embedded D(x) 6=⊥, it contains a hard commitment of the hash of D(x) as the message.
Otherwise, if x is not in the database, it contains a soft commitment of empty message.
The remaining nodes of the tree have commitments to the hash of all the children nodes.
The commitment in the root node is the final commitment to the set. In the proving phase,
to prove x is in the database with D(x) = v, the prover generates a proof of hard opening,
from the specific position where D(x) is embedded, to the root. At each level in the tree,
the proof for the commitment is with respect to the position in the commitment. While
for a key x that is not in the database, the prover firstly patches up the missing subtree
(which is pruned before) and generates a tease for soft commitments.
The advantage to using the proposed MSVC in ZK-EDB is that it guarantees the pri-
vacy and leaks no information of the database even the size of the set, at the same time,
it enhances the efficiency due to the aggregation of the opening, which supports batch
verification for the opening proofs of the commitments in the structure.
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6.5.2 Mercurial subvector commitments in stateless blockchain
In public blockchain, we consider the account-based model cryptocurrencies, such
as Ethereum [124]. Without losing generality, let’s assume that each user in this net-
work has multiple accounts, and the user can generate a vector commitment (C,aux) by
calling HCommit(m, param) and publish the commitment on blockchain. In the com-
mitments, the messages m are the balance of the accounts and the account addresses
can be the indices in the commitments. To publish transaction T , the user computes a
proof πi = HProve(i,m[−i],aux), proving the spending account is one of the commit-
ted messages in the commitment. If more accounts are involved in a transaction, the
user can aggregate the individual proofs {πi}(i ∈ S) into a single one by calling Ag-
gregate(H,(C,V ),S,m[S],{πi : i ∈ S}) for efficient verification, where S is the involved
accounts. The (aggregated) proof is included as part of the transaction, which can be
validated with HVerify(C, i,mi,πi) or AggreVerify(F,C,S,m[S],Π̂). Upon the transaction
being proved and logged on the blockchain, the user updates the balance in the corre-
sponding positions in the commitment C with HUpdate(C,V ,S,m[S],m′[S],aux). For
consortium blockchain, we assume there are many organisations forming a consortium
blockchain. For example, the blockchain is for a financial union, which is composed of
many banks. Each bank has its own users and possesses their accounts. The bank sets the
largest number of users and generates a commitment with the current users’ accounts. For
the vacant positions, the messages are set to be zero on the exponent. When a new user
is registered, the corresponding position is updated with the information of the new user.
There is a block generator that manages the system and produces new blocks by validating
the transaction and logging valid blocks on the chain. In this case, when a transaction is
conducted, the bank coordinator generates a transaction and computes a proof on behalf
of the user. The block generator can validate the transaction and produce the block.
The advantage to using the proposed MSVC in blockchain with the account-based
model is that it not only reduces the space size to store a large number of accounts, but
also guarantees the privacy of the accounts. The commitments leak no information of the
accounts and the proofs only involve the related accounts and get zero knowledge of the
rest of the accounts for external observers.
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6.6 Summary
SVCs are useful in stateless blockchain. In this chapter, we proposed a new primitive
MSVC, which enjoys the desirable features for both mercurial commitments and subvec-
tor commitments. MSVC supports two ways to commit and open the messages and also
enjoy efficient update and aggregation in the opening proofs. We formalised the system
model and security models of MSVC and proposed a concrete construction. We proved
the security of the proposal. We presented theoretical analysis of the proposal to show its
practicality. We also showed the applications of MSVC in blockchain-based cryptocur-
rencies with account-based model and ZKS.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Works
“Go confidently in the direction of your dreams.
Live the life you’ve imagined.”
– Henry David Thoreau
In this thesis, we investigated blockchain-based applications. We aimed to enhance
the security and privacy of blockchain-based applications based on cryptographic tools.
The contributions, together with potential future works in each topic are summarised as
follows.
Balancing users’ privacy and accountability remains a major challenge in decentralised
cryptocurrencies. In Chapter 3, we provided a positive answer towards resolving the
conflict between two fundamental dichotomies of security requirements in cryptocurrency
transactions. We introduced the concept of Traceable Monero and proposed a concrete
construction of this new cryptocurrency. The proposed framework achieves the properties
of correctness, balance, anonymity and traceability. Both the efficiency analysis and the
implementation results show that the proposed system is comparable to the underlying
Monero in efficiency.
IoT is dramatically changing manufacturing and production in traditional enterprises,
which can be combined with blockchain to achieve decentralised IoT. In Chapter 4, we
integrated blockchain-based self-tallying voting systems in decentralised IoT architecture
to solve the fairness issues in self-tallying systems with two distinct mechanisms and pro-
vide a concrete construction. We proved the security of the construction and also imple-
mented it to test the efficiency of the proposed protocol. Future works include designing
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a prototype of the voting system and constructing a voting protocol for the large universe.
Non-equivocation is an essential security requirement for distributed systems, including
blockchain. In Chapter 5, we came up with some new primitives to deal with equivocation
in blockchain-based applications. Specifically, we presented PoAPS on top of PBVSS
with a black-box construction and an instantiation based on ECDSA. Security proofs are
presented to demonstrate the unforgeability and extractability of the proposal. We also
integrated our proposal with blockchain-based cryptocurrencies to detail the punishment
by losing the deposit. We evaluated the algorithms to test the time costs and the gas
costs, which show the practicality of the scheme. Some potential applications were also
discussed. Future work includes exploring more expressive policy to design more general
spending rules.
Subvector commitments are effective tools to reduce the storage space and to enhance
the efficiency, and hence, they have a great many potential applications, especially in
stateless blockchain. In Chapter 6, we proposed a new primitive of MSVC with a con-
crete construction based on [85] with all the desired properties a vector commitment is
supposed to enjoy. We formalise the system model and security model and prove the se-
curity under the proposed model. We provided possible applications with MSVC in ZKS
and stateless blockchain. Possible future work includes generating vector commitments
with hiding properties and aggregation across commitments.
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